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IV. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
This appeal arises from a summary judgment for the Defendant
lawyers on the grounds of proximate cause in a $23 million legal
malpractice

action of some complexity.

The appeal presents

important issues on the potential scope of lawyer liability.
Plaintiff-Appellants, in seeking reversal, have for the first time
proposed a new rule of proximate cause in legal malpractice actions
—

a "things would have been different" rule of proximate cause,

that would make lawyers nothing less than guarantors of their
clients' business and legal expectations. The Appellants' proposed
rule is contrary to Utah law and the Restatement.

Appellees,

therefore, respectfully request oral argument.
V.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to sections 78-2-2(4) and
78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code, and Rules 3(a) and 4, of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
VI.
1.
essential

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the
element

of

proximate

cause

when

all

the

damages

Plaintiffs specified and claimed arose out of seven business
transactions between Plaintiffs and Northstar Communications, Inc.
("Northstar"), and Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), nonparty business entities, and every element of those seven business
transactions

of

which

Plaintiffs

complained

and

for

which

Plaintiffs claimed damage was exclusively the product and result of
business decisions and directions by those non-party business
entities and not the Defendant lawyers?

2*

Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the

essential

element

of

proximate

cause

when

all

the

damages

Plaintiffs claimed were premised on the award of the FCC license
for Channel 13 to Plaintiffs, and on the uncontroverted facts
Plaintiffs, after one year of seeking a financial partner to buy
out competing applicants for Channel 13 including the competing
applicant who had been awarded the license by the FCC, never
obtained a commitment or even a proposal that would have provided
the financing necessary to buy out the competing applicants and
obtain the license on which Plaintiffs based their damage claims —
Plaintiffs simply failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
that, absent the Defendant lawyers' breach of duty, they would have
achieved the better business result for which they claimed damages?
3.

Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the

essential element of proximate cause when a finder of fact could
only conclude that Plaintiffs had their own lawyer every step of
the way in their dealings with Northstar and Allstate from July of
1986

until

this action was

filed,

and

had

their

own

legal

representation in all seven business transactions with Northstar
and Allstate for which they claimed damages?
4.

Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the

essential element of proximate cause by argument, accusation and
speculation as to whether the Defendant lawyers had used or misused
confidential

information

of

Plaintiffs

when,

on

the

clear

uncontroverted record after two years of discovery, there was
absolutely

no

showing

of

any use or misuse

information of Plaintiffs?

2

of

confidential

The standard of review for each of these issues is the same
standard as that used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment —

the Appellate Court reviews the facts, and the

inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the losing
party.

If the Appellate Court concludes there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact, the Appellate Court reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness.
Engineering Inc., 808 P.2d

1137, 1139

See Hunt v. ESI

(Utah Ct. App.), cert,

denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154,
1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993).
VII.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
VIII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN
COURT BELOW.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded to the

Defendant lawyers in a legal malpractice action, (R. 12375-82. )1
Plaintiffs

sought more than $23 million

in damages relating

exclusively to their failed business expectations from a venture to
acquire a VHF license for Channel 13 in Salt Lake City. (R. 20-38,
7173.)

Simply

put,

Plaintiffs

lost

because

they

failed

to

demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the essential bridge of
proximate cause between their claims of fault and damage, (R. 1237581.)

1. The principle documents and testimony cited in the Defendant lawyers'
brief are in their Addendum ("Defs.' Add.") filed herewith. The documents and
testimony in the Addendum are arranged according to their record number, and are
indexed by name and record number for the Court's convenience. Both the record
number and Addendum exhibit number are cited at pages 5-13 of this Brief;
thereafter, the cite generally is only to the record number.

3

Defendants Richard Wiley and his firm, Wiley, Rein & Fielding
("Wiley Rein"),

are, of course, lawyers.

(R. 21, 3390.)

The

Defendants, as Plaintiffs correctly contend, represented Plaintiffs
in a venture to acquire the VHF

license for Channel

13 in

competitive proceedings before the FCC. (R. 3390-91, 3410, 3419-25.) Two
of the Plaintiffs —

David Lee and Clayton Fouiger —

are also

lawyers, a fact Appellants failed to point out. (R. 3425, 10446;
c. Fouiger Dep. at 5-6.)

Lee is the senior partner in the Washington

office of the Salt Lake firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
where, since September 1987, he has been the partner of his old
classmate

Barry

Wood,

the

lawyer

who

primarily

represented

Plaintiffs in their quest for an FCC license from 1981 to December
1986.

(R. 3419-25.) Mr. Wood, who did the FCC work, is not a party

Defendant, but Mr. Wiley, who only performed .25 hours of legal
services for Plaintiffs in that entire six-year period, is. (R. 20,
3390-91, 3410, 3419-25.)

Fundamentally,
Plaintiffs,

two

of

this

is

whom

are

a

lawsuit

lawyers

and

against

lawyers

all

whom

of

by
were

represented by their own lawyers, for breach of lawyers' duties —
conflict of interest — that seeks as damages, business damages for
Plaintiffs' failed business expectations that were proximately
caused, if damages they be, by Northstar and Allstate, business
entities that are not parties to this action.

Plaintiffs lost

because, while there were controverted facts on the issue of breach
of professional duty, there was no genuine issue of fact that any
demonstrated breach of duty by the Defendant lawyers proximately
caused the damages Plaintiffs claimed.

4

The Defendant lawyers were awarded summary judgment on the
issue of proximate cause.
with

all

their

The Court will note that Plaintiffs,

polemics,

have

failed

to

point

out

the

uncontroverted facts germane to the correctness of that ruling.
(R. 3327-37.)

The critical facts, controverted and uncontroverted,

are:
1.

The

uncontroverted

fact was

that

by

January

1986,

Plaintiffs had lost their quest to acquire the VHF license for
Channel 13.

Plaintiffs formed a venture to participate as a

competing applicant for the award of Channel 13 commencing in 1981.
Plaintiffs

were

administrative

unsuccessful.

By

the

end

of

1985,

an

law judge had entered a decision awarding the

license to another applicant.

This decision had been affirmed by

the FCC, and Plaintiffs7 only remaining hope was the unlikely
prospect of further appeal, (R. 3420-22 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), R. 5319-21.)
2.

The uncontroverted fact was that Barry Wood and his firm,

Wiley Rein, represented Plaintiffs in their quest for Channel 13
before

the

3.

FCC.

(R. 3410 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 3 ) , 3420-24 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex.

4).)

Plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine issue of fact as to

whether the Defendant lawyers, in view of their representation of
Plaintiffs, had breached their professional duties by representing
Northstar with regard to its interest in providing financing in
Plaintiffs' Channel 13 venture without Plaintiffs' informed consent
to that conflicting representation.

In July 1986, at a time when

Plaintiffs were actively engaged in pursuing financing to buy out
the competing applicants for Channel 13 including the winning
applicant,

the

Defendant

lawyers,

through

Barry

Wood,

incontrovertibly requested Plaintiffs' consent to the Defendant
5

lawyers' representation of Northstar.

The request the Defendant

lawyers made was that they would represent Northstar

in its

dealings with Plaintiffs, but continue to represent Plaintiffs
before the FCC.

The Defendant lawyers thus sought Plaintiffs7

consent to represent Northstar in its dealings with Plaintiffs,
while representing both Northstar and Plaintiffs' interest before
the FCC where they shared a common interest, (R. 3390-91 (Defs.' Add. Ex.
1), 3411-12 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 3), 3422-24 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 10726-27, 10738-39,
10744-45, 10789-90, 10864, 10883.)

Barry Wood unequivocally testified he obtained Plaintiffs'
Consent.

(R.

3423-24

(Defs.'

Add. Ex.

4),

10651-71,

10690-91.)

Plaintiff

Joseph Lee testified he refused to consent to the Defendant
lawyers' representation of Northstar.

(R. 4959-60.)

Mr. Wood's

testimony was confirmed by the facts: (1) Plaintiffs immediately
went out and retained their own lawyer, Ralph Hardy, of the
Washington law firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson ("Dow Lohnes"); (2)
Mr. Hardy, from July 15, 1986 on, represented Plaintiffs for over
four years in every transaction in which Plaintiffs and Northstar
had

adverse

interests while the Defendant

lawyers, in those

transactions, represented Northstar; and (3) in that entire fouryear period, Plaintiffs' new lawyers never once complained or
intimated that the Defendant lawyers had any conflict of interest
in their representation of Northstar. (R. 3412-13 (Defs.' Add. EX. 3),
3424-25 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 3451 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 5), 3457-60 (id.), 3559 (Defs.'
Add. Ex. 6), 3565-66 (id.), 3568-70 (id.), 3696-97 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 7), 3702-04,
7278, 7451-568 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7469-8294, 8339-9495, 9624-9777, 9827-9954,
10054-248, 10458, 10744-46, 10799-800, 10808-09, 10864-66, 10883, 10903-04, 1098182; Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol I) at 143-47, 166, 195, 221-28; id^_ (Vol. II) at 7-8,

19, 41, 45-46) But, the Defendant lawyers conceded, for purposes of
6

their motion for summary judgment, that Mr. Lee's testimony created
a genuine issue of fact on the issue of breach of professional
duty. (R. 3330-31.)

4.
claimed,

Incontrovertibly, all Plaintiffs' damages, every dime
arose

Plaintiffs,

out

Northstar

of

seven

and

business

Allstate.

transactions

between

Incontrovertibly,

all

Plaintiffs' damages with regard to these seven transactions were
specified by Plaintiffs in answers to interrogatories, answers
Plaintiffs never sought to amend.

Incontrovertibly, all damages

sought by Plaintiffs were founded on the fundamental assumption
that Plaintiffs were successful in acquiring the license for
Channel 13 or, to put the matter conversely, if Plaintiffs had not
been successful, Plaintiffs would not have sustained any of the
damages

they

Claimed.

(R. 2 0 - 3 8 ,

3997,

7173

( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 9 ) ,

7180-98;

P i s . ' Deps. f i l e d pursuant t o Court Order a t R. 3 8 4 3 - 4 4 . )

The

seven

business transactions, the only transactions,

between Plaintiffs on one side and Northstar and Allstate on the
other side were:

(1) the "MWT Ltd. Transaction" —

the initial

arrangement between Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs late in
November 1986 to provide the financing necessary to acquire the
Channel

13

license

through

settlements

with

the

competing

applicants and for construction and initial operation of Channel
13, which is reflected in a Credit Agreement and the MWT Ltd.
Amended and Restated Agreement of Ltd. Partnership, dated as of
November 18, 1986; (2) the "Adams Transaction" in the fall of 1987
— MWT Ltd.'s purchase of Channel 20, an independent UHF station in
the Salt Lake market, from Adams T.V. of Salt Lake City, Inc.
("Adams") , for $30 million and the financing of that purchase
7

through a $22.5 million senior secured note to Aetna Life Insurance
Company

("Aetna");

(3) Northstar's conversion

from a limited

partner to the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. pursuant to the MWT
Ltd. agreements in May 1988; (4) Northstar's suspension of payments
under Plaintiffs Jo-Ann Kilpatrick/s/ Sidney Foulger's and George
Gonzales7 employment contracts with MWT Ltd. in January 1989, and
the

similar

suspension

of

Plaintiff

Joseph

Lee's

employment

contract in June 1989; (5) a 1988 dispute over whether MWT Ltd.
should pay 25% interest and sign a management contract with
Farragut Communications Inc. ("Farragut"), the holding company of
Northstar, which had been organized in November 1987, to obtain
loans from Allstate to meet MWT Ltd.'s then delinquent obligations
to Adams and Aetna; (6) MWT Ltd.'s sale of Channel 13 to Fox
Television Stations Inc. ("Fox"), for $41 million in April 1990;
and (7) MWT Ltd.'s cash calls on December 30, 1991, calls which
were never paid, to make up deficiencies in each partner's capital
account upon MWT Ltd.'s dissolution, again as provided in the MWT
Ltd. Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership, (R. 2038# 3327-29, 3997; Pis.' Deps. filed pursuant to Court Order at R. 3843-44.)

The damages arising from these seven transactions claimed by
Plaintiffs, as specified in their answers to interrogatories, were:
(1) the fair-market value of a 40% interest in Channel 13 in 1987 - $9,530,000; (2) lost cash disbursements from the operation of
Channel 13, 1987-1993 —

$4,377,000; (3) 40% of the difference

between the 1993 fair-market value of Channel 13 and the fairmarket value of Channel 13 in 1987 —

$5,986,000; (4) Plaintiffs'

lost capital contributions to the Channel 13 venture —
(5) Plaintiffs' expenses on the Channel 13 venture —
8

$239,446;

$10,848.76;

(6) legal expenses paid by Joseph Lee to Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy for its preparation of Lee's employment contract with
Channel 13 and gifts of MWT Ltd. & MWT Corp. ownership interests —
$3,000; (7) amounts not paid by MWT Ltd. under employment contracts
with Channel 13, 1989-1992 —

$939,145.71; (8) Mr. Gonzales' loss

of a car under his employment contract with Channel 13, 1989-1991 - $14,400; (9) Mr. Gonzales' IRA penalty regarding the termination
of his employment contract with Channel 13 — $1,900; and (10) cash
calls made by Northstar on December 30, 1991, again, calls that
were never paid —

$2,007,132.82. (R. 7173 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 9), 7180-98.)

All these claimed damages relate exclusively to Plaintiffs'
failed business expectations with regard to their Channel 13
venture with Northstar and Allstate, and frame the fundamental
issue of proximate cause: Did the fault shown proximately cause the
damages claimed?
5.

The

Defendant

lawyers

put

an

uncontroverted

and

uncontradicted record before the lower court which established that
every

element

—

every

single thing

—

of which

Plaintiffs

complained and for which they sought damages with regard to the
seven business transactions between Plaintiffs, Northstar and
Allstate, was solely the product and result of the business
decisions and directions by Northstar and Allstate, business
entities which are not parties to this litigation, and were not the
product or result of any decision or direction by any of the
Defendant lawyers.

In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, for example,

Plaintiffs complained of their proportionate ownership interest,
the amount of financing, and the right of Northstar to convert to
become the general partner of MWT Ltd.
9

Each of these elements,

however, was solely the product of decisions made by the management
of Northstar and Allstate, and the Defendant lawyers had nothing to
do with determining Plaintiffs' relative ownership, the amount of
financing, or Northstar's right of conversion under the MWT Ltd.
Transaction.

(R. 3 3 3 4 - 3 6 ,

3392-96

(Beta.'

2),

3413-16

( D e f s . ' Add. E x . 3 ) , 3 4 5 0 - 6 0

6),

3559-62

(id.),

6.

3565-71

(id.),

Add. E x . 1)

#

3404-06

( D e f s . ' Add. E x . 5 ) ,

3696-3706

(Defs.'

Add. E x .

3556
7),

( D e f s . ' Add.

Ex.

( D e f s . ' Add. Ex.
7271.)

There was simply no genuine issue of fact that Plaintiffs

were represented by their own lawyers every step of the way from
July 1986 through the sale of Channel 13 to Fox in April 1990 with
regard

to

all

their

dealings

with

Northstar

and

Allstate.

Plaintiffs were represented by their own lawyers, Dow Lohnes, and
a senior partner of that firm, Ralph Hardy, in every one of the
seven business transactions between Plaintiffs, Northstar and
Allstate. Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy's competence in the discharge
of their responsibilities was unquestioned by Plaintiffs. (Pis.# Br.
at 45.) Some Plaintiffs denied, however, that Dow Lohnes and Ralph
Hardy

represented

Plaintiffs

as their

lawyer and denied, in

particular, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs as
their lawyers in the MWT Ltd. Transaction in November 1986. (icL. at
13.) But, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy's representation of Plaintiffs
in every transaction is incontrovertibly established by: (1) Ralph
Hardy's testimony; (2) Dow Lohnes' billing records; (3) the role
performed by Dow Lohnes in each of the transactions; (4) the
documents

drafted

and

reviewed

by

Dow

Lohnes

including

the

settlement agreements between Plaintiffs and the other competing
applicants for Channel 13; (5) the letters written by Dow Lohnes to
the Defendant lawyers, Northstar and Allstate; and (6) what is

10

literally

a stack of exhibits that is two feet thick which

reflects, exhibit after exhibit, the legal services performed by
DOW L o h n e S
Add.

Ex.

3565-66

for

4),

P l a i n t i f f s .
(Defs.f

3451

(id.),

3568-70

(R. 3 4 1 2 - 1 3

Add. E x .

(id.),

5.),

3696-97

10757,
800,

10237-48

10760-61,

10808-09,

143-47,

166,

(Defs.'

10774,

195,

221-28;

10883,

10780-81,
10903-04,

id^_ ( V o l .

(id.),

3559

(Defs.#

II)

Add.

10694-95,

10704,

10706,

10785,

10787-89,

10792,

10794-95,

at 7-8,

19,

41,

Add. E x .

Ex.

11

6),

7451-

9827-9954,

10458,

10981-82; D e f s

(Defs.'

7282-83,

( D e f s . ' Add. E x . 1 2 ) , 9 6 2 4 - 9 7 7 7 ,

Add. E x . 1 2 ) ,

10776,

10862-64,

3457-60

3423-25

( D e f s . ' Add. E x . 7) , 3 7 0 2 - 0 4 ,

8 2 9 1 ( D e f s . ' Add. E x s . 1 1 - 1 2 ) , 8 3 3 9 - 9 4 9 5
10054-248,

( D e f s . ' Add. E x . 3 ) ,

10745-47,

(Vol.

10799I)

at

45-46.)

Indeed, every exhibit, every document relating to the services
of Dow Lohnes, supports the conclusion that Dow Lohnes and Ralph
Hardy provided Plaintiffs with legal representation and not merely
financial advice. There is not one exhibit, not one document, not
one piece of paper, to the contrary. There was no genuine issue of
fact as to whether Plaintiffs had their own lawyers because no
reasonable finder of fact could find other than that Plaintiffs had
their own competent legal representation in their dealings with
Northstar and Allstate.

Plaintiffs' attempt to raise an issue of

fact as to whether they had their own legal representation not only
fails, but shows Appellants7 desperate attempt to sustain this
malpractice action against these Defendant lawyers.
7.

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate there was a reasonable

likelihood they could have obtained the necessary financing for
Channel

13 from CPL or any source other than Northstar and

Allstate.

Plaintiffs thus failed to establish a genuine issue of

fact that there was a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs, in the
absence

of

the

Defendant

lawyers7

alleged

breach

of

their

professional duties, could have obtained the better business
11

result, the acquisition of Channel 13, for which Plaintiffs claimed
damages.

CPL never made a commitment to provide financing to

Plaintiffs.

It only made a proposal, (R. 7080 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 8).)

CPL's proposal would have only provided CPL funds of $2 million,
which was not enough to even fund the settlements with the
competing applicants, and Plaintiffs incontrovertibly rejected the
CPL proposal with the advice of Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy, (R. 343443 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 5447-48, 7080 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 8), 7208-30 (Defs.' Add. Ex.
10), 7284-86, 7481-87 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7508-09 (id.), 7806, 8278-92 (Defs.'
Add. Ex. 12); J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Dep. Exs. D-225-26 (Defs.' Add. Exs. 13-14);
Defs.' Add. Exs. 16-17.)

8.

The uncontroverted record established that the Defendant

lawyers never used or misused any confidential information of
Plaintiffs.

After two years of full discovery, Plaintiffs simply

failed to raise any genuine issue of fact as to whether the
Defendant lawyers had used or misused any confidential information
in any of the dealings between Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate.
The Defendant lawyers put in a clear and categorical record that
they

never

used

or

misused

any

confidential

information.

Plaintiffs never controverted or contradicted that record and were
never able to point to one single piece of confidential information
used

or misused

by the Defendant

lawyers.

The

information

Northstar and Allstate received regarding Plaintiffs were received
from Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs attempted to persuade them to finance
the Channel 13 venture. Furthermore, all the information relative
to Plaintiffs was a matter of public record which Plaintiffs had
made in pursuit of their application for the Channel 13 license
before the FCC.

Plaintiffs simply failed to point to one single

piece of information that was not part of the public record or that
12

Plaintiffs themselves had not directly made available to Northstar
and Allstate.
financing

Certainly, in seeking millions of dollars of

to pay for settlements

with

competing

applicants,

Plaintiffs disclosed the terms of those settlements to the business
parties they were requesting to finance the settlements, (R. 3391-92
(Defs.' Add. Ex. 1), 3413 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 3), 3415 (id.), 3421 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4),
3424 (id^), 3453 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 5), 3560-61 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 6), 3698-99 (Defs.'
Add. Ex. 7), 7524-32 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7538-39 (id.), 10453-56, 10591-92, 1055051, 10606, 10627, 10636, 10700-01, 10755.)

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS,

1.

The FCC Proceeding For Channel 13.
In 1980, the FCC approved a new VHF drop-in channel, Channel

13, in the Salt Lake market, (R. 3555.)

The individual Plaintiffs

("Mountain West Partners" or "Partners"), organized Mountain West
Television Company ("Mountain West"), a Utah general partnership,
to seek the license for Channel 13 as a competing applicant in the
comparative hearing process before the FCC. (R. 3410, 3420-21.) There
were four other competing applicants, (R. 3421, 3555.)
In the FCC proceedings, Mountain West presented Plaintiff
Joseph Lee, a long time figure in the Utah broadcasting industry,
as the person providing Mountain West with broadcasting experience,
and the Foulger Group, successful Washington, D.C. businessmen with
Utah connections, as providing the financial resources for the
Mountain West application,

(R.

7237-58; Dep. Ex. D-IO.)

The Foulger

Group filed detailed financial information with the FCC. (R. 7237-58,
7524-25, 10591-92.)
information,

(R.

All the Partners

filed

detailed

personal

23-24, 7524, 10453-54, 10606, 10627, 10700-01; Dep. Ex. D-IO.)
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In May 1985, the FCC Administrative Law Judge awarded the
Channel 13 license to Salt Lake City Family Television, Inc.
("Family") , and ranked Mountain West second.

(R.

3421; Dep. Ex. D-IO.)

The FCC Review Board affirmed the award to Family in December 1985.
(R. 3422.) These adverse decisions left Mountain West with two
alternatives:

(1) the unlikely prospect of further appeal, or (2)

settling with the other applicants.
2.

(R. 5319-21.)

The 1986 Settlements And Search For Financing.
After losing, the Partners decided to attempt to buy out the

four other competing applicants to obtain the Channel 13 license.
(R. 3422# 7475-77.) They also decided to seek a financing partner to
pay for these settlements and provide additional financing for the
Channel

13 venture, even though the Foulger Group had

Capability.2

that

(R. 3422, 7248, 7369, 7 4 7 5 - 7 7 ; D e f s . ' Add. E x s . 1 5 . )

During 1986, the Mountain West Partners engaged in extensive
efforts to find financing, contacting numerous sources including
Neuberger & Berman, J. H. Foster & Company, Halcyon Investments,
Communications Partners Ltd. ("CPL"), American Television of Utah
(Skaggs) , Belo, First Chicago, and Northstar. (R. 3422-23, 7284-86,
7481-88, 7806, 7826-29, 8278-81; J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Defs. ' Add. Ex. 16.)

Northstar and other potential investors, from the inception, made
it clear they would only consider providing financing for the
Channel 13 venture on the condition Mountain West reach global
settlements with the competing applicants, (R. 3558, 3697, 10812.) No

2. Sidney Foulger and the other members of the Foulger family who are
Plaintiffs are affluent and sophisticated businessmen who, among other things,
are the principal owners of the Crossroads Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.
7248, 10585; Defs.' Add. Ex. 15.)

14

one was going to provide financing unless they could be assured of
obtaining the license, (id.)
Pursuant to their plan to settle and seek outside financing,
the Partners negotiated settlements with the other applicants
during the summer and fall of 1986. (R. 3434-41, 3558, 7204-30; Defs.' Add.
Exs. 13-14.)

The Foulger Group, through Plaintiff Brent Pratt,

spearheaded the negotiations, (R. 7529-30, 10674-780, 10812.) Barry Wood
and

Dow

Lohnes

negotiations,
execution.

and

represented
reviewed

Plaintiffs

the

in

settlement

the

settlement

agreements

(R. 7 3 6 6 - 6 9 , 7 5 3 3 - 3 9 , 7 8 0 7 - 2 7 , 7 8 5 0 - 5 3 , 8 1 1 3 - 8 1 3 3 , 8 1 8 9 - 9 5 ,

8282-86; Defs.' Add. Ex. li (vol. i) at 166.)

before
8198-99,

Mountain West agreed to pay

Family, the winning applicant, $2 million and the other three
applicants $1 million each.3 (R. 3434-41, 3649, 7204-30,- Defs.' Add. EXS.
13-14.)
P l a i n t i f f s did not make any claim or seek any damages for t h e
settlement
reason.

agreements,

First,

agreements

with

(R. 20-38.)

They did not do so for

t h e r e was no c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t regarding t h e
competing

s e t t l e m e n t agreements,

applicants.

Plaintiffs

Second,

without

(R. 7173, 7180-98.)

the

would never have acquired t h e

Channel 13 l i c e n s e — the foundation for a l l P l a i n t i f f s '
claims,

good

Third, P l a i n t i f f s '

damage

e x p e r t , Mr. Schutz,

t e s t i f i e d t h e terms of t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreements were r e a s o n a b l e .
(D. schutz Dep. at 56.) Indeed,

if

Plaintiffs

had paid t o o much i n

3 . The Family s e t t l e m e n t , which was signed on October 6, 1986, required the
$2 m i l l i o n be put in escrow by November 17, 1986, or a $150,000 penalty would be
imposed and the settlement voided.
(R. 7208-30.)
The other s e t t l e m e n t
agreements required $1.3 m i l l i o n of the t o t a l be paid the e a r l i e r of December 31/
1986 f or ten days a f t e r Mountain West was awarded the l i c e n s e .
(R. 3430-44;
D e f s . ' Add. Exs. 13-14.)
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settlement, overpayment would have been an independent cause for
the failure of the Channel 13 venture.
3.

The Seven Business Transactions Between Plaintiffs, Northstar
And Allstate.

The MWT Ltd. Transaction
In the early summer of 1986, Northstar, a company engaged in
the business of acquiring and operating broadcast properties,
became interested in entering into a financing arrangement with
Mountain West to acquire the Channel 13 license, (R. 3552, 3555-58.)
Northstar was backed financially by Allstate.4 (R. 3694-95.) At that
time, William Lincoln, one of the founders of Northstar, was its
President, and Katherine Glakas ("Glakas"), another founder, was
the

Vice

President.

(R. 3551-53.) The

Allstate

representative

responsible for dealing with Northstar in 1986 was Paul Renze
("Renze"). (R. 3694-95.)
During the summer and fall of 1986, Lincoln, Glakas and Renze
had discussions with the Mountain West Partners and their lawyer,
Ralph

Hardy.

(R. 3 4 5 0 - 5 1 , 3 5 5 6 - 5 8 ,

3696-97,

7487-88,

7490-94,

7503, 7505,

8279-

85.) Northstar and Allstate, however, did not commit to provide any
financing for the Channel 13 venture until the end of November
1986, after the Mountain West Partners had settled with the
Competing
Defs.'

applicants.

Add. E x .

11

(Vol.

I)

(R. 3 4 5 0 - 5 3 ,
at

3556-60,

3696-98,

7366-69,

7507,

7514-20;

145-47.)

In November 1986, Northstar and the Partners began face-toface negotiations at Wiley Rein's law offices in Washington, D.C.
4. At the time of the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Allstate owned all the
preferred stock of Northstar, which was convertible into 80% of the common stock.
Lincoln, Glakas and several other third parties owned all the issued common
stock. Although Allstate had not converted its preferred stock to common stock,
Allstate required its approval for any deal with Northstar because it provided
Northstar's funding. (See R. 10688-89.)
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(R.

3451,

3558-59,

3697,

7507,

7514-20,

8285-87.)

The

Mountain

West

Partners—Clayton Foulger, David Lee and Brent Pratt, two of whom
were lawyers—and their three Dow Lohnes lawyers—Hardy, David Wild
and Timothy Kelley, sat on one side of the table.

On the other

side were the Northstar principals, Lincoln and Glakas, with
Northstar's three Wiley Rein lawyers—John Quale, Merilyn Strailman
and Timothy Danello. (R. 3451, 3558-59, 7514-20, 10767.) Renze did not
attend, but was in constant contact with Lincoln by telephone, (R.
3558, 3697.)
At these negotiations, the Mountain West Partners, Northstar's
management, and Allstate finally reached an agreement.

Their

agreement is reflected in a Credit Agreement and a Partnership
Agreement ("MWT Ltd. Transaction"), (R. 3606-93.) Under the terms of
the MWT Ltd. Transaction, a newly formed limited partnership, MWT
Ltd. , was to own the Channel 13 license.

Northstar would own 49%

of MWT Ltd., and the Mountain West Partners and their newly
organized

corporation, MWT Corp., would own 51%. (R. 3562-63.)

Initially MWT Ltd.'s sole general partner was MWT Corp., but
Northstar had the option, after the station went on the air, to
convert to the general partner, (R. 3653-55, 3661-63.)
In return for its 49% interest, Northstar and Allstate were to
provide $6 million in financing, (R. 3563, 3700-01.)

Northstar was

also required, if additional funding was necessary after it became
the general partner, to use its "best efforts" to secure nonrecourse financing, (id.) The Foulger Group also agreed to provide
financing to MWT Ltd.
million

in

financing

Sydney Foulger agreed to provide $2.7
in

partnership interest, (id.)

return

for

a

21% Class

A

limited

The Mountain West Partners and their
17

corporation, MWT Corp., were required only to contribute Mountain
West's application for the Channel 13 license in exchange for their
Class B interest, and their attorneys' fees were paid by their
financing partners, Northstar and Allstate, (R. 3649, 3701.)
On November 20, 1986, Northstar, Allstate and Mountain West
consummated the transaction, (R. 3561, 7519.) On December 18, 1986,
pursuant to the settlement agreements and the MWT Ltd. Transaction,
the FCC awarded the Channel 13 license to MWT Ltd. (R. 3564.)
The Adams Transaction
At a meeting in Salt Lake in February 1987, Clayton Foulger
unexpectedly announced Sidney Foulger would not provide the $2.7
million in financing he had previously agreed to. (R. 3454, 3564, 3702,
7231.) His decision surprised everyone, (id.) Without these funds,
MWT Ltd. did not have the money to build the station.5 (R. 3564, 3702,
10479.)

Two days after Mr. Foulger's announcement, Plaintiffs, who
controlled MWT Corp., the general partner of MWT Ltd., Lincoln and
Renze met with Plaintiffs' lawyer, Ralph Hardy, in Salt Lake to
consider

their

options.

(R. 3565, 3702-03, 7232-36.)

All

the

participants, including the Mountain West Partners, unanimously
decided to put Channel 13 on the air by acquiring the assets of
Channel 20, an independent UHF station already serving the Salt
Lake market, (id.)

That afternoon, Ralph Hardy, on behalf of MWT

Corp. and MWT Ltd., sent an offer to the owner of Channel 20,

5. Northstar—still a limited partner—had met all its financing
commitments for the Channel 13 venture. It was difficult to obtain further
financing for the construction of a stand-alone station, particularly in Salt
Lake where there were 3 VHF stations and an independent UHF station, Channel 20,
already on the air, and a new UHF station—Channel 14—had been approved, but not
built. (R. 3564-65, 7540-41.)
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Adams, to purchase Channel 20 for $30 million. (icL.,- R. 7549-50, 835456.)

The Defendant lawyers were not consulted or even present at

the Salt Lake meetings, (R. 3565, 3702-03, 7232-36.)

Hardy not only

drafted the initial offer for Channel 20, which Plaintiff Joseph
Lee signed on behalf of MWT Corp., but Dow Lohnes represented MWT
Corp. and MWT Ltd. in all negotiations to purchase Channel 20. (R.
3425, 3454-55, 3565-66, 3703, 7545, 8354-56, 8359-9116, 9414-72.)
The Mountain West Partners, Ralph Hardy, and Lincoln all
looked for financing for the purchase, (R. 3455, 3566, 3703-04, 7547-48,
7550-52, 9414-72.) The best offer they received was a $22.5 million
secured senior note from Aetna, (id.; see R. 10911-69.) The terms of the
Aetna financing required that Northstar exercise its option to
become the general partner, and the employment contracts between
the Mountain West Partners and MWT Ltd. be subordinated to the
Aetna debt. (R. 7291-300, 7309-10, 7316-20, 9160, 10928.)
MWT Ltd.'s purchase of Channel 20 for $30 million and the
financing for that purchase through Aetna closed in October 1987
(the "Adams Transaction") . (R. 7321-28, 10905-10, 10911-69.) The Channel
20 acquisition permitted MWT Ltd. to put Channel 13 on the air in
November 1987 with an established market and good independent
programming, (R. 3454, 3456, 3564, 3567, 3705, 7540-41.)
Northstar7s Conversion to General Partner
Northstar, as required by the Aetna financing, exercised its
option to become the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. in December
1987. (R. 3457, 3569-70, 3705-06.) Upon FCC approval, Northstar became
the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. in May 1988, and paid an
additional $500,000 to MWT Ltd., as required by the MWT Ltd.
Transaction, (id.)
19

25% Interest Notes/Farragut Management Fee
Between 1987 and 1990, Salt Lake's economy generally, and the
television market in particular, experienced a downturn, (see R.
10189.)

Channel 13 did not generate sufficient cash flow to meet

MWT Ltd.'s obligations to Aetna and Adams, (R. 3404, 3457, 3570.)
Northstar made extensive efforts to find additional financing for
Channel 13, but was unable to find any source other than Allstate
due to the requirement that any new MWT Ltd. debt be subordinated
to its obligations to Aetna and Adams, (R. 3570.) Northstar was not
only

unable

to

find

any

outside

source

of

financing,

but

Plaintiffs, including the Foulger Group, refused to infuse any
funds into MWT Ltd. or relinquish any of their ownership in MWT
Ltd. as a means to attract further financing, (R. 3405, 3457, 3570.)
Allstate, concerned about Channel 13's deteriorating financial
circumstances and Plaintiffs7 intransigence in assisting in a
resolution of Channel 13's financial problems, demanded as a
condition to any further financing that MWT Ltd. pay a management
fee to Farragut, the holding company for Northstar, and also pay
25% interest on any further loans, (R. 3404-05, 3458, 3570, 10981-82.)
With no other source of funds to meet its obligations, MWT Ltd.
agreed to Allstate's financing terms, (id^; R. 3395-96.) Allstate then
extended further loans to MWT Ltd. to meet its Aetna and Adams'
obligations, (R. 3405.) MWT Ltd., however, did not, in fact, pay the
Farragut management fee or 25% interest to Allstate, (R. 3395-96; c.
Foulger Dep. at 230; J. Lee Dep. at 500-02.)

Employment Contracts
In June 1987, Plaintiffs Joseph Lee, Sidney Foulger, Jo-Ann
Kilpatrick

and

George

Contracts With MWT Ltd.

Gonzales

all

entered

into

employment

(R. 3567-68, 9773-74.)

In January 1989, when MWT Ltd. could not meet its obligations
to Aetna and Adams, Northstar, as MWT Ltd.'s general partner,
suspended payment under the Gonzales, Foulger and Kilpatrick
employment contracts; in May 1989, Northstar suspended payment
under Lee's employment contract, (R. 3568.)

Northstar suspended

payment under Plaintiffs' employment contracts because it was
required to do so by the terms of the Aetna financing, terms agreed
to by Plaintiffs. (icL.; R. 7291-7300, 10928.) By 1989, Aetna and Adams
had declared defaults on MWT Ltd.' s financing obligations, and were
threatening to accelerate MWT Ltd.'s $30 million debt. (R. 3396,
10168-69; see R. 10230; J. Lee Dep. at 507.)

Sale of Channel 13 to Fox
Faced with MWT Ltd. 's mounting financial crisis, Northstar put
Channel 13 on the market in January 1989. (R. 3459, 3571.) Northstar
gave Plaintiffs almost a year to bid on Channel 13 for themselves
or to find their own buyer, (R. 3396, 3459-60, 3571.)
neither, (id.; see R. 10182-91.)

Plaintiffs did

MWT Ltd. was unable to meet its

obligations to Adams and Aetna.

They demanded payment, (id.)

Allstate refused to lend MWT Ltd. any more money, and Plaintiffs
continued to refuse to put any funds into MWT Ltd. or dilute their
interest in MWT Ltd. to attract new financing from a third party.
(Id.)

Northstar, faced with the option of either selling Channel 13
or placing it in bankruptcy, accepted a $41 million offer from Fox,
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and closed the sale to Fox in April 1990. (R. 3396, 3459-60.) The $41
million price was incontrovertibly a fair price for Channel 13. (R.
3396,

$41

7566-67;

Defs.'

million

Add. Ex. 1 1

payment,

(Vol.

II)

a t 4 1 ; Dep. Ex. D - 2 2 0 . )

Northstar

and

Allstate

After

still

the

lost

approximately $2.5 million in the Channel 13 venture, (R. 3460.)
Cash Calls
After the sale to Fox closed, Northstar dissolved MWT Ltd. (R.
7259-62.) On December 30, 1991, Northstar sent Plaintiffs cash calls
to make up the deficiencies in their capital accounts as required
by the Partnership Agreement, (id.)

Plaintiffs did not pay the

calls, and Northstar has taken no action to collect them. (R. 7184,
7190-98.)

4.

Plaintiffs7 Legal Representation In FCC Proceeding And Seven
Business Transactions With Northstar and Allstate,
Wiley Rein represented Mountain West in its quest for the

Channel 13 license from April 1981 to December 19, 1986, when the
FCC awarded the license to MWT Ltd. pursuant to the settlement
agreements and MWT Ltd. Transaction, (R. 3410, 3420-22, 3424-25.) During
that period, Wiley Rein represented Plaintiffs before the FCC,
represented

them

in

settlement

negotiations,

and

assisted

Plaintiffs in their search for financing, (id^; R. 5448, 10637-42, 1067480.)

From December 19, 1986, until September 1987, Wiley Rein

continued to provide legal services to MWT Ltd. before the FCC.
The Wiley Rein lawyer who represented Mountain West and MWT Ltd.
was Barry Wood. (R. 3390, 34io, 3420-25.)
In the fall of 1987, Wiley Rein's representation of Plaintiffs
ended, (R. 3410, 3425.)

In September 1987, Barry Wood left the firm

and joined David Lee in Jones Waldo's Washington, D.C. office, (id.)
When Wood left, he took Plaintiffs' files and purchased their
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accounts receivable from Wiley Rein with Plaintiffs' consent, (id.;
R. 7199-7203.) From that point forward, Wiley Rein only represented
Northstar, and only represented MWT Ltd. after Northstar became MWT
Ltd.'s general partner in May 1988. (R. 3410.)

Wiley Rein's total

legal fees to Plaintiffs and MWT Ltd. for all services throughout
the FCC proceedings up to the time Wood left were approximately
$140,000. (See R. 3649, 7282-83.)
After

Wiley

Rein

Plaintiffs7

requested

consent

to

its

representation of Northstar in the summer of 1986, Plaintiffs in
all their dealings with Northstar were represented by Dow Lohnes
and Ralph Hardy.

Northstar, in turn, in its dealings with

Plaintiffs, was represented by Wiley Rein.

Plaintiffs concede in

their brief Dow Lohnes did its job and was not negligent. (Pis.' Br.
at 45.)

There was no genuine issue of fact that Dow Lohnes and Ralph
Hardy from July 15, 1986, when they commenced their representation
of Plaintiffs, until this action was filed, represented Plaintiffs
as

their

Northstar.
3696-97,

lawyer

did

so

because

(R.

3412-13,

3423-25,

3702-04,

7282-83,

7460-8294,

10694-95,

10704, 10706,

10054-248,

10458,

10780-81,

10785,

10903-04,

10981-82;

(Vol.

at 7-8,

II)

and

10787-89,
Defs.'

19,

41,

10792,

3451,

3454,

8339,

Add. E x .
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3457-60,

8880,

10745-47,

10794-95,
(Vol.

Wiley

at

3559,

9492-95,
10757,

10799-800,
I)

Rein

3565-66,

9624-9777,

3568-70,
9827-9954,

10760-61, 10774,

10808-09,

143-47,

represented

166,

10862-63,
195,

10776,
10883,

221-28;

idL.

45-46.)

Ralph Hardy unequivocally testified he represented Plaintiffs
as a lawyer and was retained by Plaintiffs in the summer of 1986
because "a client of Wiley, Rein was a party that they were talking
to about providing financial support and that, because of that, it
would be necessary for their group to have an independent or a
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different—you know, a lawyer to represent them . . ." (R. 7476
(emphasis supplied).) Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy are only engaged in
the profession of law.

Ralph Hardy explicitly testified that the

only business, occupation and profession in which he and Dow Lohnes
are engaged is the practice of law —

"All of my involvement with

Channel 13 was as a lawyer." (R. 7469-70, see 7464, 7466.) Dow Lohnes7
billing records confirm that Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs as
their lawyer.

From 1986 to 1990, Dow Lohnes billed and Plaintiffs

paid over $300,000 in attorneys7 fees. (R. 8278-92, 9414-95, 10237-48.)
Finally, Dow Lohnes performed
Plaintiffs7

the services and

functions of

It negotiated under Plaintiffs7 lead, it

lawyer.

drafted documents, it wrote letters explicitly stating that it was
representing Plaintiffs, and it directed legal action on their
behalf.

(R.

7460-8294,

10903-904,

10981-82.)

8339-9495,

9624-9777,

9827-9954,

10054-248,

10862-63,

Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes performed extensive legal services
in connection with the MWT Ltd. Transaction and Mountain West7s
search for financing. In July 1986, Ralph Hardy traveled to Dallas
to meet with the principals of CPL, and traveled to Chicago to meet
with Allstate; in October 1986, he met with lawyers for the Skaggs
family to negotiate financing to acquire the Channel 13 license.
Dow Lohnes performed detailed economic analysis of Northstar7s and
CPL7s written proposals. It gave Plaintiffs advice with regard to
settling with competing applicants and reviewed the settlement
agreements before they were signed.

Dow Lohnes negotiated with

Lincoln, Glakas, and Renze over operation and control issues, and
the business terms of the Credit and Partnership agreements,
including

the

amount

and

timing
O A

of

funding,

the

respective

ownership interests of the parties in MWT Ltd., and Northstar's
right and timing of conversion.

Dow Lohnes lawyers, including

Hardy, David Wild and Tim Kelley, attended the November face-toface negotiations, and assisted in drafting the Credit Agreement
and Partnership Agreement, (R. 3412, 3450-51, 3557-59, 3696-97, 7278-79,
7514-21, 7526-30, 7537-39, 7573-8269, 8278-87, 10582-83.)
When the MWT Ltd. Transaction concluded and Dow Lohnes' legal
work was completed, Plaintiffs paid Dow Lohnes over $75,000 for
those services, (R. 8278-94.)

The transmittal letter enclosed with

the check stated: "Enclosed is a check #1006 for legal services
rendered through December 1986." (R. 8293-94 (emphasis supplied).) This
letter was signed by Plaintiff Jo-Ann Kilpatrick.6 (id.)
Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes also performed extensive legal
services in connection with the Adams Transaction for MWT Corp. and
MWT. Ltd. and charged over $175,000 for those services, (R. 9414-92.)
Dow Lohnes drafted the offer to Adams, negotiated with Adams7
attorney for the purchase of Channel 20, and drafted the purchase
agreements.
providing

Dow Lohnes negotiated and drafted the agreements

for Aetna's

financing,

including

the

subordination

agreement, (R. 3412, 3425, 3454-55, 3565-66f 3702-03, 7545-54, 8339-9495.) Dow
Lohnes was listed as MWT Corp.'s lawyer in the purchase agreements.
(R. 8880.)
Plaintiffs were represented not just by Ralph Hardy and Dow
Lohnes in the MWT Ltd. Transaction and the Adams Transaction, they
were also represented by Ralph Hardy's brother, David Hardy, a
lawyer in Salt Lake. (R. 8295-319, 9496-623.)

In fact, David Hardy

6. Furthermore, Plaintiffs gave a financial statement to Northstar and
Allstate before the MWT Ltd. Transaction closed representing Mountain West owed
Dow Lohnes over $30,000 for attorneys' fees. (R. 3621, 8134.)
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incorporated MWT Corp. for Plaintiffs, and reviewed the draft and
final Credit Agreement and Partnership Agreement with Plaintiffs
before Plaintiffs signed the agreements in David Hardy's law office
in Salt Lake, (see id.) David Hardy billed and Plaintiffs paid for
his services, (R. 8319-21.)
Indeed, Plaintiffs did not dispute that, after the Adams
Transaction, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs in
every transaction between Plaintiffs and Northstar. (R. 3331-34, 4002,
9624-9777, 9827-9954, 10054-248.) Some Plaintiffs denied, however, that
Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented them as their lawyer in the
MWT Ltd. Transaction, claiming Hardy acted only as a financial
advisor

to the Foulgers.7

(R. 4002, 5077.)

That

testimony

is

absolutely incredible in the face of the record the Defendant
lawyers presented.

In fact, Plaintiff Clayton Foulger—a lawyer,

Sidney Foulgers son and Brent Pratt's brother-in-law—testified
that Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes represented them as lawyers in the
MWT Ltd. Transaction and helped draft the Credit and Partnership
agreements.8 (R. 7278-79.)

7. Plaintiffs' claim that Dow Lohnes only represented MWT Ltd. in the Adams
Transaction is sheer nonsense and contrary to the record. Plaintiff MWT Corp.
was the general partner of MWT Ltd. at the time of the Adams Transaction and Dow
Lohnes represented MWT Corp. Ralph Hardy testified, and the Dow Lohnes billing
records reflect, Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs in the Adams Transaction. (R.
7545-48, 8339-9495.)
8.

Mr. Foulger testified at his deposition:
Q. Mr. Hardy was present at all these meetings, wasn't he?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Actively representing the interests of Mr. Foulger and the Foulger
group; isn't that true?
A. Mr. Foulger. At that time we weren't involved, as you know.
Q. But actively representing Mr. Foulger's interests?
A. Yes.
Q. As a lawyer?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Hardy participate in the drafting and negotiation of each
one of these documents that relate to the MWT, Ltd. transaction set
forth in Exhibit 2?
A. He did. (R. 7278.)
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There was no genuine issue of fact that in every transaction
between

Plaintiffs

and

Northstar,

Dow

Lohnes

represented

Plaintiffs, and Wiley Rein represented Northstar. There is not one
exhibit, one document, one piece of paper that contradicts or
controverts the inescapable conclusion that Dow Lohnes and its
senior partner, Ralph Hardy, provided independent, competent and
vigorous representation in all Plaintiffs' business dealings with
Northstar.

The one thing Dow Lohnes did not do is object or

protest that any of the Defendant lawyers had a conflict of
interest in representing Northstar. (R. 3412, 7521-23, 7555-56; Defs. Add.
Ex. 11 (Vol. II) at 7-8.)

5.

Northstar And Allstate's Management Made The Decisions And
Directed The Events In The Business Transactions Of Which
Plaintiffs Complain And For Which They Seek Damages*
Northstar and Allstate's managers categorically testified that

they, and they alone, made the decisions in all seven transactions
between Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs, with the exception of
the sale to Fox and the cash calls.

Lincoln, Renze, Glakas, and

Richard Doppelt ("Doppelt"), categorically testified that every
single element in those business transactions was the product and
result of the decisions and directives that they made, and not the
product or result of anything the Defendant lawyers did. (R. 3404-06,
3450-60, 3556-71, 3696-706; see R. 3392-96, 3413-16.)

Their

testimony

Was

uncontroverted.
With regard to the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Lincoln and Renze
categorically testified they, and they alone, determined the amount
and

timing

of

Northstar's

funding, the

respective

ownership

interests in MWT Ltd. and Northstar7s conversion rights reflected
in the Credit Agreement and Partnership Agreement.
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Wiley Rein

simply drafted the documents that Northstar, its client, directed
it

to

draft.

(R. 3 4 5 1 - 5 3 , 3 5 5 9 - 6 4 , 3 6 9 7 - 3 7 0 1 ; s e e R. 3 3 9 2 - 9 3 ,

3413-14.)

With regard to the Adams Transaction, the purchase of Channel
20 for $3 0 million and the financing of that purchase through Aetna
were Plaintiffs7 deal, and Plaintiffs with their own lawyer, Ralph
Hardy, negotiated, drafted and finalized the deal. MWT Ltd. Corp.
was MWT Ltd.'s general partner and controlled MWT. Ltd.

While

Lincoln and Renze supported those decisions, they did not make
them.

Wiley Rein was not even at the meeting in Salt Lake when

Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate with Plaintiffs7 lawyer, Ralph
Hardy, made the decision to purchase Channel 20. (R. 3454-56, 3565,
7543, 10905-10; see R. 3393-94, 3414-15.)
With regard to Northstar7s conversion to general partner,
Lincoln and Renze decided, pursuant to the terms of the MWT Ltd.
Transaction that Northstar would elect to become the general
partner of MWT Ltd. in December 1987, and would become the general
partner

i n May 1 9 8 8 .

(R. 3 3 9 4 - 9 5 , 3415, 3457, 3 5 6 9 - 7 0 ,

3705-06.)

With regard to the 25% interest/management fee, Allstate,
based on Doppelt's recommendations, made the decision to require
MWT Ltd. to pay 25% interest and sign a management contract with
Farragut as a condition to lending MWT Ltd. money, (R. 3404-05, 3416,
3458, 3570-71.) Northstar had no alternative but to sign the notes to
keep MWT Ltd. afloat, (R. 3395-96.)
With regard to the suspension of payments, Lincoln and Doppelt
made the decision to suspend payments under the Mountain West
Partners7 employment contracts because the Aetna subordination
agreement Plaintiffs signed required suspension, (R. 3394, 3415, 356869.)
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Lincoln made the decision to put Channel 13 up for sale. (R.
3571.)

The Northstar Board made the business decisions to sell

Channel 13 to Fox and issue the cash calls, (R. 3396, 3405, 3416, 345960, 3571.)
6.

Richard Wiley, As A Northstar Director And Farracmt
Shareholder, Did Not Make The Decisions Or Direct The Events
In The Seven Business Transactions Of Which Plaintiffs
Complain And Seek Damages,
Richard Wiley was a director of Northstar from July 7, 1986,

until January 31, 1992; from November 1987 until the sale to Fox,
he was a director and small shareholder of Farragut.9 (R. 3390, 355354.) The elements in the seven business transactions of which
Plaintiffs complain were not the product or result of Mr. Wiley's
role as a director of either corporation, and certainly were not
the product of his role as a shareholder of Farragut.

The

uncontroverted fact was all those transactions would have occurred
and did occur as the result of Northstar and Allstate's management,
regardless of Wiley's vote, except the sale of Channel 13 to Fox
and the cash calls, (R. 3404-06, 3450-60, 3556-71, 3696-706.)

In every

instance when Wiley voted, there was always an independent majority
of the Board who voted to approve management's decisions and the
transactions, except the sale to Fox and the cash calls, (R. 3393-96,
3456-57, 3459, 3564, 3567, 3569-71.) The decision to sell Channel 13 to
Fox and the cash calls were business decisions made by Northstar's
Board at a time when Wiley Rein was not representing any Plaintiff.
(R. 3396, 3406, 3410, 3425, 3459-60.)

9. In November 1987, Wiley purchased 10% of Farragut's common stock, (R.
3553-54.) Wiley received no proceeds from the sale of Channel 13 to Fox. (R.
3396.)
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In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Northstar's Board did not vote to
ratify the transaction or the Partnership or Credit agreements
reflecting that transaction until after the business terms had been
decided and agreed to by the Mountain West Partners, Lincoln and
Renze.10 (R. 3393-94, 3567.) In the Adams Transaction, Northstar's
Board did not vote on the transaction, (R. 3394, 3567.) With regard
to conversion and the employment contracts, the Northstar Board
only voted to ratify the actions previously taken by Northstar's
management.

(R. 3394-95, 3568-70.)

With

regard

to

the

25%

interest/management fee, the Northstar Board authorized Lincoln to
sign the 25% interest notes because there was no other financing
available to pay the Aetna and Adam's obligations then due. (R. 339596.)

With regard to the sale of Channel 13, the Northstar Board

voted to ratify Lincoln's decision to put Channel 13 on the market.
(R. 3571.)
Wiley voted to sale Channel 13 to Fox, and his vote was
necessary to authorize the transaction by Northstar. (R. 3396.)
Wiley voted for the transaction because he believed that the only
alternative

was to

sell Channel

13 to

Fox

or place

it in

bankruptcy.

Prior to the sell, Wiley did everything he could to

keep Channel 13 from being sold; he repeatedly requested that
Allstate provide further financing, but Allstate refused, (R. 3396;
see R. 10185.) Wiley asked Plaintiffs and their lawyer, Ralph Hardy,
to help with a financing plan to pay Adams and Aetna, but
Plaintiffs

refused.

(R. 3459-60.) Wiley

thought

there

was

no

10. At this time, there were six members of the Northstar Board; at the
time of Northstar's conversion to general partner, the suspension of payments
under the employment contracts, Allstate's demand for 25% interest notes and the
decision to put Channel 13 on the market, there were four members of the Board;
by the time Channel 13 was sold to Fox, only Wiley and Glakas remained on the
Board. (R. 3393-96)
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alternative and authorized the sale. (R. 3396, ioi85-87.) At the time
of his vote, Wiley Rein was not representing any Plaintiff, (R.
3410.)
After

Channel

13 was

sold, Wiley

and Glakas, the only

remaining Northstar Directors, voted for Northstar to dissolve MWT
Ltd. because the sale had disposed of substantially all MWT Ltd.'s
assets, (R. 7259-62.) Then, as required by the Partnership Agreement,
Northstar issued cash calls to all the MWT Ltd. partners, including
Northstar, because there were deficits in the partners7 capital
accounts. (IdL.; see R. 3659-60.)
7.

There Was No Showing Of A Reasonable Likelihood Plaintiffs
Would Have Acquired The Necessary Financing For Channel 13
From CPL Or Any Other Source.
Plaintiffs in their brief repeatedly assert that, in the

summer of 1986, they obtained $10 million commitments in financing
for the Channel 13 venture from both Northstar and CPL. (pis.' Br. at
9, 23, 38.) Plaintiffs7 assertions are made out of whole cloth. If
Plaintiffs received $10 million commitments from Northstar and CPL,
where are they?

They certainly are not in Plaintiffs' record.

The fact is, after one year of actively seeking financing, the
only commitment Plaintiffs received was from Northstar for $6
million of direct financing in late November 1986. (see R. 3453, 355661, 3573-693, 3696-99; J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Defs.' Add. Ex. 16.) Plaintiffs
never received a commitment from Northstar until the Credit and
Partnership agreements were signed in late November 1986. (See id.)
Plaintiffs never had a commitment from CPL or any other party, (R.
5447-48, 7080, 7284-86, 7472-78, 7481-87, 7806, 8125-33, 8198-99, 8278-91; Defs.'
Add. Ex. 16.)
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Plaintiffs did receive a proposal, not a commitment, from CPL
that was not definite or specific as to its terms, (see R. 7080.)
More importantly, CPL was only willing to put-up $2 million of CPL
money to finance the Channel 13 venture, (seeid,.) That amount would
not have even financed the settlement agreements, (R. 3434-41, 3649,
7208-30; Defs.' Add. Exs. 13-14.)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs

testified

they

rejected

the CPL

proposal because they did not trust one of the CPL principals, and
because CPL wanted a 70% interest.11 (R. 7277, 7284-85.) Mountain West
did not attempt to reinstate the CPL proposal when Northstar
allegedly changed the deal in November 1986. Mountain West did not
attempt to contact CPL when there was an issue as to whether they
wanted to purchase Channel 20. (R. 5153-54.)
8.

There Was No Showing The Defendant Lawyers Used Or Misused
Confidential Information Of Plaintiffs,
The Defendant lawyers put in a clear record that they never

used or misused any confidential information concerning Plaintiffs
in their representation of Northstar. (R. 3390-92, 3413, 3415, 3424, 3453,
3560-61, 3698-99.) All information Lincoln, Glakas and Renze had
regarding

Plaintiffs was disclosed

by Plaintiffs

in the FCC

proceedings to obtain the license and by Plaintiffs and their
counsel, Dow Lohnes, directly to Lincoln, Glakas and Renze in the
course of Plaintiffs' attempt to persuade those business entities
t o become t h e i r

financing partner.12

(R. 3421, 3698-99, 7524-32, 10606,

11. There is also evidence Plaintiffs rejected the CPL proposal because CPL
would not agree to let Joseph Lee manage the station. (Defs.' Add. Ex. 17.)
12. The information Wood had with regard to Mountain West's settlement with
West Valley was a matter of public record before the FCC, and the terms and
conditions of the settlements with Family and West Valley had been disclosed to
Lincoln, Glakas and Renze by the Mountain West Partners and their lawyer, Hardy,
in the course of the November face-to-face negotiations. (R. 3421, 3424, 3698-
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10627, 10636, 10700-01, 10453-54, 10591-92, 10550-51.) Lincoln and Hardy
testified that, as a matter of common business practice, Northstar
and Allstate would not have entered into an agreement with Mountain
West to provide $6 million in financing for Channel 13 without
knowing Plaintiffs' financial position, Plaintiffs7 business plans,
and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreements Northstar
and Allstate had been asked to finance, (R. 3561, 7531-32.) That record
was uncontroverted.
Moreover, neither Wiley nor any Wiley Rein lawyer representing
Northstar in the seven business transactions had any confidential
information concerning Plaintiffs, (R. 3391-92, 3413, 3424.) The FCC
pleadings, the general correspondence from Wood, and the letters
concerning Plaintiffs7 legal bills which Wood routed on occasion to
Quale

and

Wiley

contained

no

confidential

or

privileged

information, (see pis.' Br. at 3 n.2.) Wood did not represent Northstar
in

the

MWT

Ltd.

Transaction,

and

testified

he

knew

of

no

confidential information regarding Plaintiffs in his possession at
the time of that transaction, (R. 3424.)
Wiley Rein did not represent Adams in the Adams Transaction,
and

it

was

uncontroverted

Wiley

Rein

did

not

disclose

any

information concerning Plaintiffs to Adams, (R. 3515.)
9.

Plaintiffs7 Attempts To Put-up Other Straw Men Are Immaterial
To The Issue Of Proximate Cause,
Several straw men postulated by Plaintiffs in their brief are

untrue and immaterial to proximate cause.

For example:

99, 7524-32, 10453-54, 10550-51, 10591-92, 10606, 10627, 10636, 10700-01.) The
Foulger-Pratt financial statement was on file with the FCC, and Sidney Foulger
provided his financial statement to Northstar and Allstate's management during
the negotiations to assure them he had the financial wherewithal to meet a $2.7
million obligation. (R. 3561, 7748.) The other Mountain West Partners were not
going to put-up any money.
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1.

Plaintiffs' assertion Wiley Rein represented Adams with

regard to the possible purchase of Channel 13 and the sale of
Channel 20, and that John Quale represented Adams in those matters
is a deliberate attempt by Plaintiffs to mislead the Court.
pis.' Br. at 4.)

(see

In early 1986, Wiley opened a file for Adams

concerning whether a third party who was not an applicant for
Channel

13

could

purchase

the

Channel

successful applicant, (R. 5552-53, 5620-22.)

13

license

from

the

Wiley Rein spent less

than 3 hours on the matter, and no further work was done after
February 1986, consistent with Wiley Rein's representation of
Plaintiffs, (see R. 5620-21.) Russ Eagan, not John Quale, was the
lawyer responsible for the Adams representation, (R. 5553; see R. 6348.)
Quale only spent a total of .50 hours in early 1986 on Adams'
matters.

2.

(See R. 5620-21.)

Plaintiffs' assertion Allstate was a client of Wiley Rein

in the summer of 1986, and their implication Wiley Rein represented
Allstate in the transactions at issue are false,

(see Pis.' Br. at 6.)

Wiley Rein never represented Allstate in any of the transactions at
issue, and only represented Allstate on a few insurance claims
beginning in 1988. (R. 3391, 3406, 3412, 3706, 56io, 5633, 5764-67, 7350-52.)
3.

Plaintiffs

made

assertions regarding Wood.

a

number

of

false

and

misleading

For example:

a. Wiley Rein red-lining dispute. Plaintiffs make much
ado about a dispute between Wiley Rein and Wood regarding Wiley
Rein's representation of Northstar in the MWT Ltd. Transaction,
(see pis.' Br. at 15-16.) The dispute, however, had nothing to do with
any conflict of interest.

It related to an accusation that Wiley

Rein had altered the Credit Agreement after the negotiations, but
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before it was signed, (R. 6452-56.) The accusation was untrue, as
conclusively demonstrated by a red-lined version of the Credit
Agreement Wiley Rein sent to Plaintiffs' lawyer in Salt Lake—David
Hardy, who is Ralph Hardy's brother. (Dep. EX. D-69.) John Quale was
upset with Wood because he had initially sided with Plaintiffs with
regard to the accusation, (R. 6452-55, 10868-70.) There was no basis for
the accusation, and Quale did not believe a Wiley Rein lawyer
should be accusing his partners of improper conduct without the
facts.

(id.)

An

investigation

shortly

after

the

MWT

Ltd.

Transaction resulted in Wood's censorship, but had nothing to do
with a conflict of interest, (R. 10885-98.) Statements made in the
investigation are not adverse to the Defendant lawyers but, in
fact, confirm they obtained Plaintiffs' consent to Wiley Rein's
representation of Northstar, and that Plaintiffs agreed to and did
retain their own lawyer—Dow Lohnes. (R. 10864, 10876, 10883, 10886.)
b. Wood's representation. Plaintiffs' implication Wood
represented Plaintiffs and Northstar in negotiations in the MWT
Ltd. Transaction is categorically
supported by the record cited.

false and certainly is not

(see Pis.' Br. at 13.) Wood did not

represent Northstar in the MWT Ltd. Transaction negotiations, and
Wood so testified, (R. 3422-24; see R. 3557.)

Wood did not represent

Plaintiffs in the negotiations, and Wood so testified, (R. 3422-24.)
The only services Wood performed with regard to the MWT Ltd.
Transaction were: (1) giving the parties historical information as
to the status of the FCC proceeding; (2) performing work toward
regulatory approval of the MWT Ltd. Transaction after it closed;
and (3) working toward settling with competing applicants, (R. 341012, 3430-33, 3422-24.)
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c. Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar, Plaintiffs'
assertions Wood told Wiley Rein it could not ethically represent
Northstar, and objected to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar
are false and contrary to the record they cite.

(see pis.' Br. at 5,

14, 16.) Wood testified he never objected to Wiley Rein representing
Northstar,

and

never

told

Wiley

Rein

its representation

of

Northstar was unethical, (R. 7361-63, 10643-50, 10690-91.) Plaintiffs'
sole

support

for

its

assertion

is

a memorandum

purportedly

containing Wood's "beliefs" which the Defendant lawyers moved to
strike because it was written in connection with attempts to settle
this matter while Wood was practicing law with David Lee, was
inadmissible hearsay and contrary to the record, (R. 7130-33, 7373-94.)
d.

Plaintiffs' settlement agreements.

Plaintiffs'

assertion that "Wood knew they were in a terrible position because
they had to pay $2 million . . . and had no financing alternative
available at the time . . ."is false and misleading.

(See pia.' Br.

at 14 n.5.) The record shows that Wood testified it was Plaintiffs'
fault, not Wiley Rein's fault, that they found themselves in the
position of having to make a $2 million escrow payment to Family
without the financing commitment they wanted from Northstar and
Allstate.

(R. 5477.) He testified

Mountain West had

made the

decision, on it own, to sign the settlement agreements without a
firm financing commitment, contrary to Wood's warning not to do so.
(id.) As a consequence, Mountain West was in the position that it
either had to find alternative financing or accept Northstar and
Allstate's offer.
e.

Date of Wiley Rein

meeting.

Plaintiffs' assertion

"on June 11, 1986," Mr. Wiley, Mr. Quale and Mr. Wood met to
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discuss the firm's representation of Northstar is false and not
supported by the record cited.

(see pis.' Br. at 5.)

There is

absolutely no evidence Wiley, Quale and Wood met on that date to
discuss Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar. (see R. 7364.)
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Unquestionably, proximate cause is an essential element of
Plaintiffs' legal malpractice claim. Proximate cause requires not
only "but for" causation, it requires "substantial" causation. The
fault shown must be the "substantial" cause of the damages claimed.
That is the fundamental rule of proximate cause in Utah in all tort
actions, including actions for breach of fiduciary duty.
The Utah Supreme Court, moreover, has squarely held that to
prove proximate cause in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff
must show that, in the absence of a defendant lawyer's breach of
duty, there is a reasonable likelihood the plaintiff would have
achieved

the better

plaintiff

claims

business

damages.

or
The

legal result
"reasonable

for which the

likelihood"

rule

requires that a plaintiff's damage claim be grounded in reality and
not speculation and fantasy about what might have been.
The uncontroverted facts show there was no genuine issue of
material fact on the essential element of proximate cause. First,
every

element

in

the

seven

business

transactions

of

which

Plaintiffs complained and sought damages were the exclusive product
and result of the decisions and directives of Northstar and
Allstate, non-party business entities, and not the result of any
breach

of

duty

by

the

Defendant

lawyers.

Second,

it was

incontrovertible that Plaintiffs had their own independent counsel,
Dow Lohnes, every step of the way in every business transaction
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between Plaintiffs and Northstar and Allstate.

Third, Plaintiffs

failed to show any reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of
the Defendant lawyers' alleged breach of duty, conflict of interest
they would have obtained the better business result, including the
license for Channel 13, for which they claimed damages.
The lower court correctly applied Utah's rules of proximate
cause in awarding the Defendant lawyers summary judgment.

That is

why Plaintiffs, for the first time, now contend there

is a

different rule, a new rule of proximate cause, for claims based on
breach of fiduciary duty as opposed to claims based on negligence.
Plaintiffs are wrong; the rules are the same.

Plaintiffs simply

propose a new rule because their legal malpractice claim is barred
by the rules of proximate cause.
Plaintiffs propose a "chain of events" or a "different course
of action" rule of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty
cases.

Essentially, Plaintiffs propose a "things would have been

different" rule. Plaintiffs' new rule is contrary to Utah law and
the Restatement, and would base the requisite causal connection
between

fault

and

damage

on

speculation

and

remoteness.

Plaintiffs' new rule would make lawyers the guarantors of their
client's

legal

and

business

expectations

regardless

of

the

likelihood those expectations would have been realized in the
absence of the lawyer's fault.
Finally,

Plaintiffs

have

not

pointed

to

one

piece

of

confidential information the Defendant lawyers used or misused in
their representation of Northstar or, for that matter, one single
piece of confidential information the Defendant lawyers even had at
the time of any of the seven business transactions.
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It was

uncontroverted that all information Northstar and Allstate had
concerning Plaintiffs was information they obtained directly from
Plaintiffs or which was part of the public record Plaintiffs filed
with the FCC.
The Court, therefore, should affirm the lower court7s summary
judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact on the
essential element of proximate cause.
X.
A.

ARGUMENT

IN UTAH, THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE IS THAT PROXIMATE CAUSE, AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM, REQUIRES NOT
ONLY "BUT FOR" CAUSATION, BUT "SUBSTANTIAL" CAUSATION.
Proximate cause is an essential element of a legal malpractice

claim, and courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on
the issue of proximate cause despite a prima facie showing of
breach of duty.

See, e.g., Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah

1988); Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894
(Utah 1978); Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1991);
Johnson

v.

Schroeder,

Jones,
412

652

N.W.2d

P.2d
447

650

(Idaho

1982);

(Neb.

1987);

see

Stansberv

also

Holmes

v.
v.

Securities Investors Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 117 L. Ed 2d
532, 543-45 & nns.10-12, 556 (1992); Fausett v. American Resources
Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (D. Utah 1982); Prosser
& Keeton on Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
"Prosser111 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 9, 431 & cmt. e, 874
& cmt. b, 910 (1965).
Proximate cause, at a minimum, requires "but for" causation.
That is, a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find "but for" a defendant's wrongful conduct, the
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plaintiff would not have suffered cognizable injury. Prosser § 41;
see Mitchell v. Pearson Enter. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985);
Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896; Yusefzadeh, 932
F.2d at 1264; Johnson, 652 P.2d at 655; Stansberv. 412 N.W.2d at
450.
Proximate

cause,

however,

not

only

requires

causation, it also requires "substantial" causation.

"but

for"

The fault

shown must be the "substantial" cause of the damage claimed.

That

is the fundamental rule in Utah. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46; see
Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896-97; see also Prosser
§ 41; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 & cmts. a & e (1965).
"Substantial" causation is required to show proximate cause
because, without it, there would be infinite liability for every
wrongful act.

Without it, every wrongful act could be said to be

the cause of any event, no matter how remote.

Prosser § 41;

Holmes, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 543 n.10, 544-45, 556.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE UTAH RULE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE TO THE SEVEN
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS DEMONSTRATES THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE
OF FACT ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.
If Plaintiffs were injured by any of the seven business

transactions of which they complain and seek damages, it was not
"but for" any legal malpractice of the Defendant lawyers.

Not a

single element, decision or event in any of the seven transactions
about which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages would have changed
or been different had Wiley Rein not engaged in the alleged breach
of duty, conflict of interest.

The result in each of the seven

business transactions would have been the same if Wiley Rein had
resigned and not represented Northstar.

The results would have

been the same if Wiley Rein had represented Plaintiffs.
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If

Plaintiffs wanted to sue someone regarding the seven business
transactions, they should have sued their business partners—
Allstate and Northstar.
If Plaintiffs were injured by reason of any of the seven
business transactions of which they complain and seek damages, it
was "but for" the terms, decisions and actions dictated and
directed by the business non-parties.

The Defendant lawyers did

not decide, dictate or direct the business transactions between
Plaintiffs, Northstar

and Allstate*

Northstar, Allstate and

Farragut—business non-parties—made every decision and dictated
every term and action in all seven business transactions which
Plaintiffs claim caused them damages.

Lincoln, Glakas, Renze and

Doppelt testified that Northstar and Allstate, not the Defendant
lawyers, dictated and directed every term and action in the
business transactions, including the amount and timing of funding,
Northstar and Plaintiffs' ownership interests in MWT Ltd., and
Northstar's right to convert to general partner in the MWT Ltd.
Transaction. That testimony was uncontroverted. (R. 3404-06, 3450-60,
3 5 5 6 - 7 1 , 3 6 9 6 - 7 0 6 ; s e e R. 3 3 9 2 - 9 6 ,

3413-16)

P l a i n t i f f s have admitted t h a t Northstar and A l l s t a t e , not t h e
Defendant lawyers, made t h e decisions about which they complain. 13
For example, P l a i n t i f f s '

brief

states:

"Defendants 7

June 1986

13. P l a i n t i f f s ' b r i e f i s r e p l e t e with admissions t h a t Northstar and
A l l s t a t e made t h e d e c i s i o n s of which P l a i n t i f f s complain and for which they seek
damages.
For example, P l a i n t i f f s s t a t e :
"When P l a i n t i f f s objected t o the
purchase [of Channel 2 0 ] , N o r t h s t a r ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s t a t e d t h a t i f P l a i n t i f f s
did not go along with the d e c i s i o n t o purchase Adams' Channel 20, Northstar and
A l l s t a t e would not provide even the funding they had agreed t o at the squeeze
down. Based on t h a t ultimatum, the [Mountain West] Partners again concluded they
had no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o accede once again t o N o r t h s t a r ' s d e c i s i o n . " [ P i s . ' Br.
at 16 ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . ] P l a i n t i f f s further s t a t e : " A l l s t a t e decide t o s e l l
[Channel 1 3 ] . . . . Northstar and Farragut . . . decided t o s e l l the s t a t i o n t o
Fox."
f Id. at 20-21 (emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . ]
Sidney Foulger t e s t i f i e d i t was
Northstar and A l l s t a t e t h a t caused h i s damage. (R. 7271.)
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breaches set in motion a chain of events in which Northstar/
Allstate

. . . forced their decisions on Plaintiffs.

Absent

Defendants7 breaches of full disclosure and consent in June 1986,
none of the events in that chain, including the decisions of
Northstar /Allstate, could have occurred."

(pis. Br. at 39-40 (emphasis

supplied).)

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot hold the Defendant
lawyers responsible for the business decisions of Allstate and
their client, Northstar.14

See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.,

203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); accord Franko v.
Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).15

Lawyers are

not principals; they are simply agents of their clients, and cannot
be held responsible for the business decisions of those clients.
In fact, a lawyer has no right or duty to compel his client or a
third party to make a particular business decision, or to prevent
his client from implementing a business decision with which he
disagrees.

A client has the right to make its own business

decisions and to implement those business decisions through its
counsel.

Purdy, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 535.

Moreover, if Plaintiffs were injured as the result of these
business transactions, it was "but for11 Plaintiffs' own voluntary

14. This rule applies even when the lawyer represents both parties to the
transaction. See Purdy., 203 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35. In this case, however, the
Defendant lawyers did not engage in simultaneous adverse representation, contrary
to Plaintiffs' assertion.
15. The only two authorities Plaintiffs cite, In re D.H. Overmyer
Telecasting Co., 77 B.R. 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) and Johnson v. Miller, 596
F. Supp. 768 (D. Colo. 1989), are not to the contrary. Both these cases involve
illicit conduct by a party. In Overmyer, the party was a client of the lawyer.
In Johnson, the party was not a client. The issue in both cases, unlike here,
was whether the lawyer should have foreseen the illicit conduct of another and
avoided it. Here, non-party business entities made business decisions, and it
was those business decisions that were the direct cause of Plaintiffs' claimed
damages, not the Defendant lawyers.
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decisions and actions, not "but for" the Defendant lawyers' alleged
breach of duty, conflict of interest.

See Dunn, 584 P.2d at 897.

If Plaintiffs were unhappy with Northstar's offer and the business
terms Northstar and Allstate demanded in the MWT Ltd. Transaction,
they

could

have

walked

away; they

could

have

financed

settlements themselves to obtain the Channel 13 license.
7248; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 1 5 . ) T h e y

Chose

not

the

(see R.

to.

The decision to purchase Channel 20 was under Plaintiffs'
control; Plaintiff MWT Corp. was the general partner of MWT Ltd. at
the time it purchased Channel 20, and the purchase would not have
occurred without Plaintiffs' consent and participation.
Defendant

The

lawyers were not even present at the meeting when

Plaintiffs, Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs' lawyer, Ralph
Hardy, made the decision to purchase Channel 20. If Plaintiffs had
wanted to build Channel 13 instead of purchasing Channel 20,
nothing stopped them from doing that.

Sidney Foulger could have

provided the financing he had agreed to provide in the MWT Ltd.
Transaction, or Plaintiffs could have found someone to buy out
Northstar

and A l l s t a t e .

(R. 3 4 5 4 - 6 7 , 3565, 3 7 0 1 - 0 5 , 1 0 9 0 5 - 1 0 ; s e e R. 3 6 0 6 - 9 3 ;

Defs.' Add. Ex. 15.) Again, they chose not to.
Finally, if Plaintiffs had wanted to avoid the sale of Channel
13 to Fox, they could have done so. Plaintiffs had over a year to
find a buyer for Channel 13 or to purchase the station themselves.
To prevent the sale, Plaintiffs could have agreed to equity
financing for MWT Ltd.'s debts to Adams and Aetna, or could have
agreed to Allstate7s financing terms instead of objecting and
threatening to sue. Plaintiffs, however, did none of these things,
and Channel 13 was sold to Fox for an admittedly good price rather
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than being put in bankruptcy.16 (R. 3395-96, 3404-06, 3457-60, 3570-71,
10182-91.)
C.

WILEY'S ROLE AS A DIRECTOR OF NORTHSTAR AND A DIRECTOR AND
SHAREHOLDER OF FARRAGUT AFTER NOVEMBER 1987 WAS NOT A "BUT
FOR" CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES AND WAS NOT A BREACH OF
WILEY'S PROFESSIONAL DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS,
Each term, decision and action relating to the seven business

transactions about which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages was
made by the management for Northstar and Farragut, Lincoln and
Glakas, except the sale of Channel 13 to Fox and the cash calls.
Each management decision and transaction was approved

by an

independent majority of the Northstar Board, except the sale of
Channel 13 to Fox and the cash calls, Richard Wiley, as a single
board member, did not make those decisions, direct those actions,
or impact the Board's decisions.

If Wiley had resigned from the

Northstar Board, had not been present, or had voted against the
transactions, the results would have been the same.17

Wiley,

moreover, owed no professional duty to Plaintiffs as a director of
Northstar or Farragut with regard to any of the seven business
transactions; he had no duty to do what Plaintiffs demanded in
their own best interest.

(R. 3393-96, 3404-06, 3413-16, 3450-60, 3556-71,

3696-706, 3992-96.)

16. No one coerced Plaintiffs or forced them under duress to enter into any
of the seven business transactions, particularly the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Legal
coercion and duress require a plaintiff to show that a defendant's conduct placed
him in such fear that he was deprived of his free will. See Heglar Ranch Inc.
v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390f 1391 (Utah 1980); Wiesen v. Shout, 604 P.2d 1191,
1192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Bohm v. Commerce Union Bank, 794 F. Supp. 158, 164
(W.D. Pa. 1992); see also Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ziegler, 680 F. Supp.
235, 237-38 (E.D. La. 1988).
There is no such showing here and, indeed,
Plaintiffs have made no legal argument that they were claiming coercion or
duress.
17. In fact, that is exactly what happened in the Adams Transaction. Wiley
was not even at the Board meeting when the other five directors voted to ratify
Lincoln's consent. (Dep. Ex. P-25.)
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In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, an independent majority of the
Northstar Board voted to ratify the deal that had already been
reached by Plaintiffs, Northstar7s management and Allstate, (see id.)
In the Adams Transaction, the decision to buy Channel 20 and
finance that purchase through Aetna, insofar as Northstar and
Allstate

were

concerned,

was

a

decision

of

management

and

Plaintiffs, who controlled MWT Ltd. and authorized the deal, (see
id.) With regard to Northstar's conversion to general partner, an
independent majority

of the Northstar

Board voted

to ratify

Lincoln's decision to convert Northstar to general partner, as
required by the Aetna financing which Plaintiffs had signed, (see
id.) With regard to the suspension of payments under the Mountain
West Partners7 employment contracts, the Northstar Board took no
action on Lee's contract, and an independent majority of the Board
ratified Lincoln's suspension of the other Mountain West Partners'
payments, as required by the Aetna financing, (see id.) With regard
to the 25% interest notes demanded by Allstate, an independent
majority of the Board authorized Lincoln to sign the notes with
Allstate to keep Channel 13 afloat, (see id^) With regard to the sale
of Channel 13, an independent majority of the Board voted to ratify
Lincoln's decision to put Channel 13 on the market, (R. 3571.)
It is true Wiley voted to sell Channel 13 to Fox.

But Wiley

and the only other Northstar director, Glakas, were faced with the
Hobson's choice of either selling the station or putting it in
bankruptcy.

Allstate had refused to lend MWT Ltd. any more money

despite Wiley's repeated requests, and Plaintiffs had refused to
cooperate by obtaining financing or diluting their own interest to
obtain financing.

Plaintiffs had been given one year to purchase
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the station themselves or find another buyer, but had done neither.
Faced with the choice between selling Channel 13 at an admittedly
good price or putting the station in bankruptcy, Wiley voted to
sell the station to maximize the sale proceeds.

(R. 3396, 3406, 3459-

60.)
With regard to the cash calls, Wiley and Glakas simply voted
for

Northstar

to

fulfill

MWT

Ltd.'s

obligation

under

the

Partnership Agreement to issue cash calls to all the partners,
including Northstar, because there were deficits in their capital
accounts Upon MWT Ltd.'S dissolution.

(See R. 3659-60, 7259-62.)

Finally, Wiley Rein did not represent Plaintiffs with regard
to any of these transactions and, with the exception of the MWT
Ltd. Transaction, was not representing Plaintiffs on any matter
when the Northstar Board voted to approve the transactions and
management
Plaintiff

decisions.
on

any

Wiley

matter

Rein was

when

Wiley

not

became

representing
a

director

any
and

shareholder of Farragut.18 (R. 3390, 3410, 3412-13, 3424-25.)
D.

UNDER UTAH LAW, A PLAINTIFF IN A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION MUST
DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT, ABSENT THE LAWYER'S
BREACH OF DUTY, THE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED THE BETTER
BUSINESS OR LEGAL RESULT FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS
DAMAGES; "BUT FOR" CAUSATION ALONE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT.
The Utah courts have squarely held that a plaintiff in a legal

malpractice action must present evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find that, in the absence of the breach of duty claimed,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the better business or legal

18. Incidently, Plaintiffs and their lawyer, Ralph Hardy, knew Wiley was
a member of the Northstar Board well before Plaintiffs entered into the MWT Ltd.
Transaction—"I [Ralph Hardy] think I knew that very early on"—and never
complained of his role. (R. 7357-58; Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol. II) at 46.) In
fact, the FCC reports which Plaintiffs signed and filed clearly stated Wiley was
a director of Northstar and was a director and shareholder of Farragut.
(R.
7338-39, 7357-58.)
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result for which the plaintiff claims damages would have been
achieved.

Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; see Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896.

In Barber, the defendant lawyer breached his duty by failing
to timely file an answer on behalf of his client resulting in a
default judgment. The client's motion to set aside the default was
denied.

The client then sued the lawyer, claiming the amount of

the default judgment as damages. The Utah Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to the default damages absent a
showing of a "reasonable likelihood" of prevailing on the merits in
the underlying action had the lawyer timely filed an answer.
Clearly there was "but for" causation—but for the failure to file
an answer, there would have been no default judgment.

But the

Supreme Court required more than "but for" causation. The Supreme
Court ruled, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff in a legal
malpractice action must prove proximate cause, and can only prove
proximate

cause

if

the

plaintiff

shows, in

the

absence

of

defendant's malpractice, there is a reasonable likelihood the
plaintiff would have achieved the better legal or business result
for which he sought damages.

765 P.2d at 889

The Barber rule is clearly the rule in Utah.

It was squarely

applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Dunn, a decision before Barber
which upheld a directed verdict for a defendant lawyer in a legal
malpractice action.

584 P.2d at 897.

In Dunn, the defendant

lawyer committed legal malpractice when he failed to properly serve
a summons and complaint on plaintiff's husband in Florida in
connection with a divorce action in Utah in which plaintiff was
seeking custody of her children.

The plaintiff sought damages

after losing custody in a Florida divorce action brought by her
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husband.

The plaintiff sought as damages the loss of custody of

her children in the Florida divorce action and the cost of legal
counsel in Florida. The Utah Supreme Court found that the lawyer's
failure to properly serve the plaintiff's husband had delayed the
Utah divorce proceeding, but ruled, as a matter of law, that
plaintiff failed to show the likelihood of a better legal result if
defendant had properly served the summons and complaint. In short,
the Court found that proximate cause was too speculative:
A finding of such damages cannot properly be based on
speculation and conjecture.
[Damages] can be awarded
only if there is a basis in the evidence upon which
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe with
reasonable certainty that [plaintiff's injury and damage
were] proximately caused by the negligence of the
defendant.
584 P. 2d at 896. The Barber rule is not just the rule in Utah; it
is followed in other jurisdictions as well.

See Yusefzadeh, 932

P.2d at 1265; Johnson, 652 P.2d at 655; Stansbery, 412 N.W.2d at
452.
Under

Utah

law, therefore, proximate

cause

in

a

legal

malpractice action requires more than "but for" causation.

It

requires the plaintiff to show there is a "reasonable likelihood"
that, absent the lawyer's malpractice, the plaintiff would have
achieved the better business or legal result on which his damage
claim is based.

This rule limits a plaintiff's damages to those

better business or legal results for which there is a reasonable
likelihood such results could have been achieved by the client with
proper representation.
lawyer

from

simply

The "reasonable likelihood" rule bars the

being

made

a guarantor

of

the

client's

expectations by requiring that those expectations- be grounded in
reality.
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In t h i s c a s e , P l a i n t i f f s presented no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d t h a t ,

in t h e

absence of t h e Defendant lawyers 7 claimed breach of duty, c o n f l i c t
of i n t e r e s t , P l a i n t i f f s would have achieved t h e b e t t e r business
r e s u l t for which they seek damages•19

Fundamentally,

Plaintiffs'

damage claim i s t h a t they would have succeeded in t h e i r Channel 13
venture if they had taken a d i f f e r e n t course—if they had gone with
CPL i n s t e a d of N o r t h s t a r .

(pis.' Br. at 17, 37-39.) P l a i n t i f f s

assert

this

they

Rein's

claim

even

though

clearly

knew

of

Wiley

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Northstar for four years and did nothing about
it.

P l a i n t i f f s ' claim and i t s underlying assumptions are based on

pure s p e c u l a t i o n and are contrary t o the r e c o r d .
not c r e a t e an i s s u e of f a c t .

Speculation does

See Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola

Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 142-145 (4th Cir. 1994), c e r t ,

denied,

115 S. Ct. 729 (1995); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 999 F.2d
549, 568-69 (D.D.C. 1993).
If
Allstate,

Plaintiffs

had not done t h e deal with Northstar

t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no showing P l a i n t i f f s

acquired t h e Channel 13 l i c e n s e .

and

would have

The uncontroverted f a c t i s t h a t

t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e Channel 13 l i c e n s e i s t h e premise of

all

19. Spector v. Mermelstein, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973) i s not on p o i n t .
Spector i s not a l e g a l malpractice case involving claims of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t ,
as in t h i s c a s e . More importantly, in Spector the damages p l a i n t i f f s sought for
the defendants' breach of duty , unlike t h i s c a s e , were d i r e c t l y and
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t i e d t o the information the attorney did not d i s c l o s e .
S p e c i f i c a l l y , the damages p l a i n t i f f claimed were the outstanding p r i n c i p l e and
i n t e r e s t on a defaulted loan. The defendant attorney did not d i s c l o s e t o h i s
c l i e n t t h a t the debtor was in s e r i o u s f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y , and did not have the
a b i l i t y t o repay the loan. P l a i n t i f f , t h e r e f o r e , presented evidence from which
a reasonable f a c t finder could conclude t h a t , with t h i s information, i t was
l i k e l y p l a i n t i f f would not have made the loan.
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Plaintiffs' damage claims.20 (R. 7173, 7180-98.) Settling with the
other applicants and having the financing to do that, therefore,
are

indisputably

essential

to

those

damage

claims

because

Plaintiffs had lost their application for the Channel 13 license
and could only have obtained the license by settling with the other
applicants, (R. 3421-22; s^e R. 5319-21, 7475-77.)
There is no reasonable

likelihood

Plaintiffs would

have

obtained financing from any source, other than Northstar and
Allstate, to acquire the license for Channel 13. Plaintiffs spent
a year trying to find a partner to finance the settlements with the
other competing applicants. Their efforts were unrestricted—Wiley
Rein did nothing "to impede or hinder the plaintiffs' or Dow Lohnes
&

Albertson's

attempt

to

find

another

purchaser

or

further

financing . . . " (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (vol. 11) at 45-46.) After a full year
of working at it, the only offer Plaintiffs had which provided the
money to buy out the competing applicants was the financing
commitment from Northstar and Allstate in November 1986 for $6
million in direct financing. Plaintiffs never had another offer or
firm
91;

J.

Commitment.

(R. 3 6 4 9 , 5 4 4 7 - 4 8 , 7 0 8 0 , 7 2 8 4 - 8 7 , 7 4 8 1 - 8 7 , 7 5 0 8 - 0 9 , 7 8 0 6 ,

Lee Dep. a t 1 8 9 - 9 3 ; D e f s . '

Add. E x .

8278-

16.)

The only other response that even amounted to a proposal was
from CPL.

Despite Plaintiffs' claims, however, the CPL proposal

did not remotely begin to provide enough money to buy out the
competing applicants.

CPL proposed to put only $2 million of its

own funds in the Channel 13 venture, not the $10 million Plaintiffs
20. For example, Plaintiffs claim as damages the value of a 40% interest
in the Channel 13 license in 1987, lost cash disbursements from Channel 13 from
1987 through 1993, the value of 40% of the difference between the present fairmarket value of Channel 13 and the value in 1987, and the payments under
Plaintiffs' employment contracts with Channel 13. Each of these damages is based
on and assumes Plaintiffs acquired the Channel 13 license. (R. 7173, 7180-98.)
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claim.

Look

at the CPL proposal.

(R.

7080.) CPL'S

proposed

investment was $3 million less than required to pay the settlements
alone, and $4 million less than the $6 million Northstar and
Allstate committed to provide.21

Even Plaintiffs admit it would

have taken $8 million to get the job done, (pis.' Br. at 23, 38.) If
CPL only proposed to pay $2 million and that proposal was $3
million short of paying for the settlements alone, there is no
showing of a reasonable likelihood Plaintiffs would have acquired
the

license

i n a d e a l W i t h CPL.

(R. 3 4 2 9 - 4 4 , 3649, 7 2 0 4 - 3 0 ; D e f s . ' Add. Ex.

8, 10, 1 3 - 1 4 . )

Furthermore Plaintiffs, with their own lawyer, Ralph Hardy,
rejected the CPL "proposal" for other reasons—they did not trust
one of the CPL principals and CPL wanted a 70% interest.

They

rejected the proposal while they knew Wiley Rein represented
Northstar.

Plaintiffs did not even attempt to reinstate the CPL

proposal when Northstar allegedly changed the deal. Plaintiffs did
not go back to CPL when there was an issue as to whether they
wanted to purchase Channel 20.

The fact is, Plaintiffs had no

other financing alternative except the Northstar deal.

(R. 5153-54,

7277, 7284-85, 7471-82, 8278-84.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs7 claim that they would have taken a
different course of action is a self-serving conclusion and opinion
that is contrary to the record.22

The breach of duty alleged here

21. Furthermore, CPL also wanted to control the venture and wanted a larger
ownership percentage than Northstar required. (R. 7284-85; Defs.' Add. Ex. 17.)
Northstar received a 49% interest for its $6 million. (R. 3563.)
22. Joseph Lee's conclusory opinion in his affidavit that Plaintiffs would
have gone elsewhere had they know of Defendant lawyers' conflicts of interest,
and Brent Pratt's conclusory opinion in his affidavit that Plaintiffs would have
accepted CPL's "firm commitment to provide financing of $10 million or pursued
other commitments" are self-serving conclusions and opinions without testimonial
foundation and contrary to the record, and the Defendant lawyers moved to strike
that testimony. (R. 7130-33, 7373-94.)
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is

based

on

the

lawyers7

Defendant

alleged

failure

to

get

Plaintiffs' informed consent, not on the Defendant lawyers' failure
to

tell

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs
knew

for

that

Wiley

over

four

Rein
years

represented
Wiley

Rein

Northstar.
represented

Northstar in its dealings with Plaintiffs. All they had to do was
look across the table.

Plaintiffs knew and did nothing about it

because they had their own lawyer, (R. 3412, 3558-70, 10458; Defs.' Add Ex.
11 (Vol. I) at 227; id^_ (Vol. II) at 7-8.)

Plaintiffs acknowledged Wiley Rein
Northstar

representation

before

informed them of the

Plaintiffs

rejected

proposal and entered into the MWT Ltd. Transaction.
testimony proves this point.

the

CPL

Joseph Lee's

Lee testified Wood told him in the

summer of 1986 that Wiley Rein was going to represent Northstar,
but that Plaintiffs did not consent to that representation, (R. 496063.) However, Plaintiffs did not fire Wiley Rein or get financing
from someone other than Northstar.

Instead, they went out and got

their own lawyer, Dow Lohnes, to represent them in their dealings
with Northstar.

Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs from July 15,

1986, until this action was

filed, a period

which

includes

Plaintiffs' rejection of the CPL proposal and consummation of the
MWT

Ltd.

Transaction.

These

facts

are

indisputable

and

incontrovertible, and are established by Ralph Hardy's testimony,
Dow Lohnes' billing records, Plaintiffs' payment of Dow Lohnes'
legal bills totaling more than $300,000, and all the work Dow
Lohnes performed, including the documents it drafted and reviewed.
(See R. 3412-13, 3423-25, 3451, 3457-60, 3559, 3565-66, 3568-70, 3696-97, 3702-04,
7282-83, 7451-8291, 8339-9495, 9624-777, 9827-954, 10054-248, 10458, 10694-95,
10704, 10706, 10745-47, 10757, 10760-61, 10774, 10776, 10780-81, 10785, 10787-89,
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1 0 7 9 9 - 8 0 0 , 1 0 8 0 8 - 0 9 , 1 0 8 6 2 - 6 4 , 10883, 1 0 9 0 3 - 0 4 , 1 0 9 8 1 - 8 2 ; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol.
I) a t 1 4 3 - 4 7 , 166, 195, 2 2 1 - 2 8 ; i d ^ a t (Vol. I I ) a t 7 - 8 , 19, 4 1 ,

B.

45-46.)

AS A MATTER OF LAW, A PLAINTIFF REPRESENTED BY HIS OWN
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN A TRANSACTION CANNOT PROVE ANY DAMAGES
HE CLAIMS WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
BREACH OF DUTY BY ANOTHER LAWYER.

As a matter

of

law,

a plaintiff

represented

by h i s own

independent counsel in a t r a n s a c t i o n cannot prove any damage he
s u s t a i n e d from t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n was proximately caused by another
a t t o r n e y ' s breach of duty for c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t .

See Wilhelm v.

Pray, P r i c e , Williams & R u s s e l l , 231 Cal. Rptr. 355, 359 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); Purdy, 203 Cal. Rptr. a t 534-35; see a l s o Hurlbert v.
Gordon. 824 P.2d 1238, 1244-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); In r e W.
Byron Schlaq, 96 B.R. 597, 601-602 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 23
The b e s t a u t h o r i t y for t h i s r u l e i s P l a i n t i f f s '
e x p e r t , Ronald E. Mallen.

own e t h i c s

Mr. Mallen in h i s t r e a t i s e acknowledges

t h i s i s the r u l e :
Although advice from other counsel does not excuse t h e
o b l i g a t i o n of d i s c l o s u r e , d e f i c i e n c i e s in the adequacy of t h e
d i s c l o s u r e by the lawyer may be overcome where t h e c l i e n t had
t h e a s s i s t a n c e of independent counsel. In f a c t , t h e r e does
not appear t o be any c i v i l damage action in which an a t t o r n e y
was held l i a b l e for the consequences of
representing
c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s where the c l i e n t received advice from an
independent lawyer.
Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 12.13 a t
730 (3d ed. 1989) (emphasis supplied) . 24

23. P l a i n t i f f s ' cases are not c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t cases and are not t o t h e
contrary. The Defendant lawyers do not claim Dow Lohnes was n e g l i g e n t , or t h a t
Dow Lohnes' n e g l i g e n c e caused P l a i n t i f f s ' damage, which i s the s i t u a t i o n in the
c a s e s c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s , p a r t i c u l a r l y , Cline v. Watkins, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838,
66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 176 (1977).
See a l s o a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d at pp. 44-45 of
P l a i n t i f f s ' Brief.
Here, P l a i n t i f f s were represented by very able lawyers t o
whom they looked for guidance and advice in each of the t r a n s a c t i o n s .
24. The testimony P l a i n t i f f s c i t e d of Mr. Mallen as t h e i r expert in t h i s
case i s nothing more than inadmissible speculation and conjecture without any
t e s t i m o n i a l foundation and i s contrary t o Mr. Mallen's own t r e a t i s e .
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The rational for this rule is that the plaintiff's own lawyer
provides precisely what the plaintiff has been deprived of by
reason of an improper conflict—independent legal services and
advice.

The plaintiff, therefore, has not been caused any injury

as a result of improper conflict.

In a commercial transaction, a

party's primary protection comes from the representation provided
by its own attorney.

See Wilhelm, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59; see

also Hurlbert, 824 P.2d at 1245.
Plaintiffs had their own lawyer in each of the business
transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and for which they seek
damages.

Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs as

their lawyer.

No reasonable juror could find to the contrary.

The fact Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs as lawyers in each
of the transactions is established by the testimony of Ralph Hardy,
Dow Lohnes' billing records, Plaintiffs7 payment of those legal
fees, Dow Lohnes' work product including correspondence stating Dow
Lohnes

represented

Plaintiffs,

and

the

testimony

of

every

participant in these transactions except some Plaintiffs who claim
Ralph Hardy was acting only as a financial advisor to the Foulgers
in the MWT Ltd. Transaction.

Even Plaintiff Clayton Foulger

admitted Dow Lohnes was acting as a lawyer at the November 1986
face-to-face negotiations and helped draft the agreements, (see R.
7878.)

Dow Lohnes is a law firm and Hardy is a lawyer.

The only

business, occupation and profession in which they are engaged is
the practice of law.

Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy do not give

financial advice. In the lower court there were over 200 exhibits
showing Dow Lohnes, as lawyers, represented Plaintiffs, (see R. 745154

8294, 8339-9495, 9624-777, 9827-9954, 10054-248, 10862-64, 10883, 10903-04, 10981-

82.) Hardy, a "good friend" of David Lee and the Foulgers, testified
all the work he did in connection with Channel 13 was as a lawyer:
Q.
Mr. Hardy, at any time either before or after the filing
of the Complaint in this action, did you ever tell David Lee
that you had performed work or services for anyone relating to
Channel 13 or to matters involving Channel 13 in any capacity
other than as a lawyer?
A.

No.

Q.

You7re sure of that?

A.
All of my — All of my involvement with Channel 13 was as
a lawyer.
(R. 7469-70.)

In the face of this record, the lower court properly ruled
that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether Dow Lohnes
and Hardy represented Plaintiffs as lawyers in each of the business
transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages. Merely
controverting a fact does not create a genuine issue of material
fact.
For there to be a genuine issue of material fact, a plaintiff
must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find for
the plaintiff.

Simply presenting "some evidence," as Plaintiffs

did here, is not enough.
Inc. , 509 U.S.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 484 (1993) ("in the event the

trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented
supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror
to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the
court remains free to direct a judgment . . . and likewise to grant
summary judgment . . .) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251 (1986)(reaffirming from previous cases the concept that
"in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is
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a preliminary

question

for the

judge, not whether

there

is

literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury
could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing
it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.11).25
The fact Plaintiffs had their own lawyer in every one of the
business transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages
is an independent ground for determining no proximate cause and
affirming the lower court's decision.

However, even if the Court

were to hold that, because of Plaintiffs' testimony, there is a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy
represented Plaintiffs, which there is not, there is still no
genuine issue of fact on the issue of proximate cause.
P.

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH'S RULES OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE IN AWARDING DEFENDANT LAWYERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The lower court correctly applied Utah's rules of proximate

cause in awarding summary judgment for the Defendant lawyers.
Plaintiffs really admit that.

Plaintiffs admit that the District

Court correctly applied Utah's rule of proximate cause because, for
the first time on this appeal, Plaintiffs contend that this Court
should adopt a new rule of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary
duty cases.

Plaintiffs claim that there is a different rule, a

more liberal rule, of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty
cases than in negligence cases.

Plaintiffs propose a "chain of

events" or a "different course of action" rule of proximate cause.

25. This is not a case where the lower court impermissibly weighed two sets
of conflicting affidavits as the court did in Draper City v. Bernardo, 256 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah January 19, 1995). Here, Plaintiffs, after two years of
discovery, presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find for Plaintiffs.
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Essentially,

Plaintiffs

different" rule.

propose

a

"things

would

have

been

(See Pis.' Br. at 17, 23-25, 40.)

Plaintiffs7 proposed rule is not the law, and would not make
good law. First, Utah Supreme Court authority holds that proximate
cause in breach of fiduciary duty cases requires not only "but
for," but "substantial" causation, and "substantial" causation
requires a showing of a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence
of the lawyer's alleged breach of duty, a plaintiff would have
achieved

the better business or

plaintiff seeks damages.

legal result

for which the

Those are Utah's rules of proximate

cause, rules applied in breach of fiduciary duty legal malpractice
cases.

See Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn 584 P.2d at 896-97; see

also Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46; Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1240.
Second, the uniform rule is that the rules for proximate cause
are the same for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and even
intentional torts.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 & cmt. e

(1965); Prosser § 41; Holmes, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 556 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1240. Indeed, a fiduciary's
breach of the duty of care —

negligence —

is a breach of a

fiduciary duty. See Barber, 765 P. 2d at 889; Dunn 584 P. 2d at 89697; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379 & cmt. b (1965).
In fact, the Restatement explicitly rejects any distinction
between the standard of proximate cause in negligence cases and the
standard of proximate cause in other tort cases.

Section 431 of

the Restatement of Torts squarely provides:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to
another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm, and
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(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from
liability because of the manner in which he negligence has
resulted in the harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) . Comment "e" to that
provision explicitly states:
Although the rules stated in this section are stated in terms
of the actor's negligent conduct, they are equally applicable
where the conduct is intended to cause harm, or where it is
such as to result in strict liability.
Id. § 431 cmt. e; accord id. § 874 & cmt. b (fiduciary liable for
harm resulting from breach of duty in accordance with § 910); id.
§ 910 (one injured by another's tort entitled to damages for harm
"legally caused" by tort).
Plaintiffs7 "chain of events" or "different course of action"
rule of proximate cause, moreover, would thwart the fundamental
policy behind the requirement of proximate cause.

The policy of

proximate cause requires a substantial causal connection between
fault and damage before the risk of loss is shifted on the basis of
fault.

Tort law is not simply a morality play, a lecture on legal

ethics; it requires that damages only be awarded on the basis of
fault when the fault is a substantial cause of a plaintiff's
damage.

To do otherwise would allow recovery on the basis of

remoteness and speculation.
That is precisely what Plaintiffs' new rule does. It would be
the very antithesis of proximate cause.

It would subject lawyers

to large damage awards, not on the basis of whether their fault
caused

the damage, but on the basis of speculation

potential prejudice of juries against lawyers.

and the

It is a huge and

unwarranted risk to impose upon the legal profession. Plaintiffs'
new rule would make lawyers the guarantors of their clients'
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business and legal expectations regardless of whether the lawyer's
fault substantially caused a plaintiff harm and regardless of
whether there was any reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of
the lawyer's fault, the plaintiff would have realized the better
result for which he claims damages.
Plaintiffs' new rule is just a new version of Mother Goose's
Nursery Rhyme No. 191—"For want of a nail . . . the kingdom was
lost."26

It is a nice rhyme, but a bad rule of proximate cause,

and the United States Supreme Court has said so.
Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most remote
consequences; "for want of a nail a kingdom was lost" is a
commentary on fate, not the statement of a major cause of
action against a blacksmith.
117 L. Ed. 2d at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring).

It is also a rule

that has consistently been rejected by the courts and legal
commentators.

See Mitchell, 697 P. 2d at 246; Dunn, 584 P. 2d at

896; Hawaii Corp. v. Crossley, 567 F. Supp. 609, 630-31 (D. Hawaii
1983);

Smith v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d 462, 464

(Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Prosser § 41; Robert Cooter, Torts as the
Union of Liberty & Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 ChicagoKent L. Rev. 523

(1987); Continuing Legal Education: Another

Important Tort Basic, 12 Cal. Lawyer 63 (Nov. 1992).
The New York rule Plaintiffs cite from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994), is distinguishable
26.
FOR
For
For
For
For
And

The entire rhyme reads:
WANT of
want of
want of
want of
want of
for the

A NAIL the shoe was lost,
the shoe, the horse was lost,
the horse, the rider was lost,
the rider, the battle was lost,
the battle, the kingdom was lost,
want of a horse-shoe nailI

Mother Goose's Nursery Rhymes 191 (Walter Jerrold Ed, Alfred A. Knopf Inc.
1993)(1903).
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from this case both in terms of legal doctrine and facts. Milbank
is a case applying New York, not Utah, law.

The Milbank court

applied a New York rule in which "but for" causation is not
required in corporate or principal opportunity cases. The New York
rule is a rule of restitutional damage.

That is not the law in

Utah. Utah does not loosen the "normally stringent requirements of
causation and damages" in breach of fiduciary duty cases.

See

Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn. 584 P.2d at 896.
Milbank also is distinguishable factually.
corporate or principal opportunity case.

Milbank is a

This case is not.

In

Milbank, the lawyer promised in writing that once a conflict arose,
the lawyer would not represent the client's former agent.

The

lawyer then broke that promise and joined the former agent in:
(1) using the client's funds to take the clients opportunity; (2)
misusing the client's confidential information to do so; and (3)
joining with the former agent in making the deal possible that
deprived the client of a profitable business opportunity.

The

lawyer was simply a joint tort-feasor with the former agent and
liable with the agent for the opportunity they usurped.27
Finally, Plaintiffs' new standard of proximate cause is
based

on

a

Plaintiffs'

number

of

assertion

fallacious
that

"the

assertions.
breach

itself

For
may

example,
create

circumstances which prevent the client from establishing

the

27. The other authorities Plaintiffs cite likewise are not on point. The
sections of the Restatement of Agency Plaintiffs cite have nothing to do with
causation or the type of damages Plaintiffs claim. Those sections either relate
to an agent's duty (§§ 387-398), or the remedies available for breach of duty
including nominal damages, discharge and disgorgement of profits (§§ 399-407).
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969) and Abkco Music Inc. v.
Harrisonas Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983), simply stand for the
proposition that an agent must disgorge any profit or opportunity it gained at
the principal's expense in violation of the agent's fiduciary duties.
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'reasonable

likelihood'

of

a

better

result"

is

fallacious.

Plaintiffs had a duty to show a reasonable likelihood of success
and, clearly in this case, nothing prevented them from doing that.
Plaintiffs

may

dispute

that

they

consented

to Wiley

Rein's

representation of Northstar, but the record clearly shows they knew
of

that

representation

and

retained

their

own

counsel

who

represented them in their search for a financing partner and
dealings with Northstar.
Plaintiffs' assertion that "strict 'but for' causation and
claims

based

on

breach

of

fiduciary

duty

is

conceptually

inconsistent with the purpose of the remedy" is also fallacious.
That is not the law in Utah, and the fact Plaintiffs need to avoid
the "but for" and "reasonable likelihood" standard demonstrates
there is no proximate cause.
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that "the applicable standard
requires Plaintiffs to show only that the course of action they
took resulted in loss, and that Defendants' breaches were 'a
substantial factor' in leading plaintiffs to take that course of
action" is fallacious. This standard is handmade by Plaintiffs in
this case, and has never been advanced or accepted by any court,
including those in the cases Plaintiffs cite.
G.

THERE WAS NO USE OR MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
Legally and factually, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any

use or misuse of confidential information by the Defendant lawyers.
First, Plaintiffs' claim that there is an irrebuttable presumption
of receipt and misuse of confidential information simply is not the
law.

Plaintiffs deliberately attempt to confuse a motion to
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disqualify with a civil legal malpractice action for damages.28
(see pis.' Br. at 3, 85-86.) In a legal malpractice action, unlike a
motion

to

disqualify,

no

presumption

exists.

In

a

legal

malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the lawyer had
confidential information; and (2) that confidential information was
misused.

See R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice §§ 12.16,

13.23 (3d ed. 1989).
Second, there is absolutely no factual showing the Defendant
lawyers

used

or misused

any

confidential

information.

The

Defendant lawyers put in a clear record that they never used or
misused

any

confidential

information.

Plaintiffs

never

controverted or contradicted that record and never pointed to one
piece of confidential information that was used or misused by the
Defendant

lawyers

in

their

representation

of

Northstar.29

Plaintiffs' claim of use and misuse is simply a sideshow to coverup their inability to show proximate cause.30

(R. 3390-92, 3413, 3424,

3453, 3560-61, 3698-99.)

28. The law is, in motions to disqualify, there is an irrebuttable
presumption the lawyer received relevant confidential information where the two
matters are substantially factually related.
However, even in motions to
disqualify, there is no presumption of misuse. The only cases Plaintiffs cite,
Brown v. Board, of Zoning Adj., 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. 1984), and Abkco Music, Inc.
v. Harrisonqs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988) are not to the contrary.
Brown is a disqualification case. In Abkco, the agent admitted he had used and
misused confidential information, and the language which Plaintiffs quote
demonstrates that point: "Klein himself acknowledged at trial that his offers
. . . were based, at least in part, on knowledge he had acquired as Harrison's
business manager . . . "
(Pis.' Br. at 48.)
29. Plaintiffs' claim of use and misuse of confidential information is
nothing more than inadmissible speculation and conjecture for which there is no
testimonial foundation, including the testimony they quote from their expert, Ron
Mallen.
30. The fact there was no use or misuse of confidential information may
well go to breach of duty instead of proximate cause. In any event, if there was
no use or misuse, it did not proximately cause any damage with regard to the
damages Plaintiffs claim.
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Not only was there no showing of use or misuse, there was no
showing the Defendant lawyers even had any confidential information
regarding Plaintiffs.31

No lawyer representing Northstar had any

confidential information, and Barry Wood testified that he knew of
no confidential information he had regarding Plaintiffs at the time
of

the MWT Ltd. Transaction.

uncontroverted

that

(R. 3390-92, 3413, 3424.) It was

Northstar

and

Allstate

got

all

their

information regarding Plaintiffs from only two sources—the public
record before the FCC, and from Plaintiffs as they attempted to
persuade those companies to finance the Channel 13 venture, (R. 3453,
3560-6i# 3698-99.) Plaintiffs have not pointed

to one piece of

information that was not part of the public record, or that they
did not give directly to Lincoln, Glakas and Renze.

Finally,

Lincoln and Hardy testified, as a matter of common business
practice, no one would have entered into the MWT Ltd. Transaction
with Mountain West without knowledge of the Mountain West Partners7
financial

position,

their

business

plans

or

the terms and

conditions of the settlement agreements that were being financed.
(R. 3 5 6 1 , 7 5 3 1 - 3 2 . )

Consequently,

Plaintiffs'

assertion

that

the

trial

court

"overlooked t h e f a c t t h a t misuse of c o n f i d e n t i a l information was a
s e p a r a t e breach from Defendants 7 breach of d u t i e s of l o y a l t y ,
d i s c l o s u r e and informed consent 11 i s f l a t wrong.

full

The f a c t i s , t h e

lower c o u r t properly r u l e d t h e r e was "no showing t h e

Defendant

31. P l a i n t i f f s g e n e r a l l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e Defendant lawyers obtained
" d e t a i l e d f i n a n c i a l information concerning the p a r t n e r s ' personal background,
e x p e r i e n c e , f i n a n c i a l c a p a b i l i t y , business a c t i v i t i e s , market information,
s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses, s t a r t - u p and programming s t r a t e g i e s and other matters.
They a l s o gave t h e Firm t h e i r personal f i n a n c i a l statements, which showed that
the [Mountain West] Partners had l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l s t r e n g t h . " (See P i s . ' Br. at
3, 4 8 . )
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lawyers breached their professional duties to Plaintiffs by using,
misusing, or abusing any confidential information of Plaintiffs on
any occasion."

(pis.' Add. Ex. 3, at 2.)
XI.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on
the essential element of proximate cause.

Every element in the

seven transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages
was the product and result of the decisions and directions of
Northstar and Allstate, non-party business entities, and not the
Defendant lawyers.

It is indisputable Plaintiffs had their own

independent counsel in all the transactions between Plaintiffs,
Northstar and Allstate.

Plaintiffs failed to show any reasonable

likelihood that, absent the alleged breach of duty, conflict of
interest, they would have obtained the better business results for
which

they

claim damage.

Plaintiffs7

proposed

new rule of

proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty cases is not the law in
Utah, and would base the requisite causal connection between fault
and damage on speculation and remoteness.

The District Court's

summary judgment on the essential element of proximate cause,
therefore, should be affirmed.
DATED:

^^^.^^

May |S_, 1995.

By:
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